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Abstract
Over the last few years, cities around the world have been building smart city systems in
order to improve their operational structure and to acquire a data-driven management
perspective. At an early stage, cities started deploying a few sensors of non-critical
services (e.g. atmospheric monitoring), which were considered innocuous from a global
security perspective. Nevertheless, nowadays, cities deploy sensors with a wide range of
purposes (e.g. parking, safety, lighting) and some areas have become densely populated
with wireless sensor networks (WSN). Thus, WSNs turn into an important data source
for many applications and, consequently, also become more attractive targets for attacks.
Aware of this issue, IT administrators are looking now for security solutions both for the
WSNs that are already spread throughout the city and for the ones that will be deployed
in the future.
Furthermore, WSNs are normally installed and operated by external providers. This
fact complicates security management from the global perspective of the smart city ad-
ministrators, because different providers implement different solutions using different
devices, configurations, protocols, etc., which results in a highly heterogeneous environ-
ment. Traditionally, WSN security has been approached as an independent problem
for each specific type of network and, therefore, no security solution exists that can be
applied in a generalizable manner to all the possible WSNs in a smart city. In this
context, security solutions implemented by the providers are currently the main barrier
to defend the networks. However, it is also of paramount importance to provide smart
city administrators with tools to verify that providers are indeed applying the necessary
security measures and also to check that data received from the WSNs are correct. In
this thesis, we take a first step in this direction and, taking the point of view of the smart
city administrators, we propose an intrusion detection platform to disclose attacks in the
WSNs.
In this dissertation, we identify the principal components of an architecture to handle
intrusion detection in the heterogeneous context of a smart city. The solution that we
propose is based on a centralized system that gathers all data from the WSNs. Then, a
rule-based and an anomaly-based detection engines are configured to trigger alarms in
the case of attack. This architecture does not add extra requirements for the already
deployed WSNs and it is, thereby, compatible with the existing infrastructure of the
providers.
Between the two aforementioned detection engines, we focus our analysis on the anomaly-
based engine, because it is more generalizable to different smart city configurations.
This detection engine generates mathematical models to identify deviations from the
i
ii
normal behavior of the WSN data in attack situations. In this thesis, we compare
several anomaly detection algorithms and we observe that, in this context, one-class
support vector machines results the most suitable technique.
Furthermore, we identify the various necessary steps from gathering WSN data until
running the detection techniques. We evaluate the whole procedure under the processing
requirements of this scenario and we attest that: (1) the proposed architecture is capable
of handling smart city data and (2) that the entire procedure is scalable.
Finally, by studying the effects of the most popular attacks in WSNs (these effects include
the malfunction traces and the anomalies that can be detected with the detection engines
of the proposed architecture) we derive seven different attack models. Then, we propose
a schema to help smart city administrators to classify the alarms received from the
detection engines into one of the attack models, thereby narrowing down the list of the
likely attacks and sources compromising the networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the coming decades, cities are facing new challenges characteristic of contemporary
societies: population aging, reduction in energy consumption and carbon emissions, the
struggle for greater sustainability, economic growth, etc. In addition, migratory move-
ments are rapidly increasing the size of cities. Nowadays, 50% of the world’s population
lives in cities and it is foreseen that by 2050 this percentage will be around 70% [1].
To address these challenges, smart city initiatives have emerged proposing new ways of
looking at development and city management. Currently, an internationally accepted
definition of smart city does not exist. However, the authors of [2] have proposed a
definition that has become popular: We believe a city to be smart when investments in
human and social capital and traditional (transport) and modern (ICT) communication
infrastructure fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality of life, with a wise
management of natural resources, through participatory governance.
Generally, smart city projects have the goal of improving metropolitan infrastructure
planning, automatizing urban operations, reducing costs, increasing city competitive-
ness, opening new business lines, creating employment and enhancing transparency and
openness [3]. Depending on specific needs, each city implements smart city initiatives
focusing on different sectors. The Smart City Project1, which aims at profiling and
benchmarking medium and large cities in Europe (it has covered almost 1,600 cities),
1"The Smart City Project",http : //www.smart− cities.eu
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
has proposed a smart city model including six key sectors: smart economy, smart mobil-
ity, smart environment, smart people, smart living and smart governance. From this list,
European cities are mainly implementing smart environment and smart mobility [4].
From a technological point of view, information systems are being deployed to transform
infrastructure management towards a data-driven approach following four basic building
blocks: data, analysis, feedback and adaptability [5]. In order to feed the information
systems, smart cities use elements of the Internet of things (IoT) as the main data source,
such as mobile phones, radio-frequency identification (RFID) cards and wireless sensor
networks (WSNs). The data collected by the latter are used in a plethora of applications.
For example, traffic monitoring sensors are used to control traffic lights [6] and wireless
meters are installed in pipes to monitor leaks and ruptures [7]. Moreover, these data give
city managers and other stakeholders the opportunity to plan future facilities based on
a better picture of citizens’ behavior and the real use of the current infrastructures.
The clear benefits provided by smart city technology have prompted many cities to devote
a considerable part of their innovation efforts to developing their concept of smart city.
This has caused a significant and rapid increase in the number of WSN deployments on
the streets, which has resulted in the emergence of new applications with many different
technologies, solutions, requirements, etc.
However, this accelerated deployment of smart city technology has often resulted in
putting security aside as a secondary issue. For instance, some studies [8, 9] have proven
that traffic control systems can be manipulated in real deployments in the United States
due to the lack of cryptographic and authentication systems in the sensors and, in general,
because of a systematic lack of security consciousness.
Moreover, in order to rapidly deploy WSNs and smart city technology, cities have taken
advantage of services procured from external providers. Nevertheless, outsourcing public
services has also raised security-related concerns [10].
The impact of these outsourcing policies on security can be attributed mainly to two
key factors: the loss of control over network devices and the lack of visibility over the
potential security problems affecting these devices. Indeed, public administrations usu-
ally outsource not only the implementation and deployment of their WSNs, but also
the administration thereof. In this way, security countermeasures and system logs are
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exclusively operated by external providers. Although service providers are contractually
obliged to ensure certain levels of security, in practice, smart city administrators cannot
determine the extent to which received data are precise and accurate. In fact, the Royal
Academy of Engineering has identified data quality as one of the six major barriers to
effectively optimize smart infrastructures [5].
Therefore, this thesis aims to improve smart city WSN security from the centralized
point of view of smart city administrators. The thesis outlines the principal barriers
to achieve secure WSNs in this context, and it provides the schema for an architecture
that analyzes WSN data to detect intrusions in networks operated by external providers.
This thesis also focuses on analyzing the most convenient algorithms to detect certain
intrusions and it provides smart city administrators with guidelines to locate the source
of security problems on their WSNs.
In this chapter, Section 1.1 reviews the main smart city initiatives. Secondly, Section 1.2
describes common features in smart city architectures focusing on WSN data collection.
Thirdly, Section 1.3 presents the objectives of the thesis. Fourthly, Section 1.4 describes
the research methodology used in this thesis. Finally, Section 1.5 contains the main
contributions of the thesis and Section 1.6 outlines the rest of the chapters.
1.1 Smart city initiatives
Cities, private companies and other institutions are already involved in smart city projects
to provide solutions to the contemporary challenges that cities are facing. The following
pages describe some prominent initiatives.
The PlanIT Urban Operating System 2 is a multilayered operating system for urban en-
vironments. Its control layer is responsible for responding with low latency to incidents
in the sensor/actuator infrastructure. A supervisory layer offers an application program-
ming interfaces (API) and also modules of management, analytics, storage, simulation,
security, etc. PlaceApps is a layer to publish applications. All the layers are designed
following service-oriented architectures (SOA) in order to facilitate application creation,
platform service usage and third-party module integration.
2"Living PlanIT OS", http : //living − planit.com
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Rio Operation Center 3 has been developed by IBM in Rio de Janeiro to integrate public
information from multiple governmental institutions. This center is aimed at improving
public safety and increasing incident response efficiency, mainly in the face of natural
disasters.
In [11], the authors describe a middleware implemented in Oulu (Finland). This mid-
dleware is a layer deployed on top of a series of communication networks (i.e. local
area network (LAN), Bluetooth, Wi-Fi), responsible for enabling connectivity with these
networks and giving access to data collected by city sensors. The ultimate goal of this
project is to build an actual testbed to improve communication between citizens and the
government.
Ubiquitous city (u-city)[12] is a South Korean non-intrusive, user-centered project to in-
terconnect urban services divided by area of interest (e.g. building automation, business,
governance).
In [13], the author proposes a four-layer architecture to integrate elements of the IoT into
smart cities. A key feature of this solution is the inclusion of instruments to stimulate
collaboration among elements of the system. For example, low power devices, such as
smartphones, send parts of complex processes to the cloud to be computed.
From a futuristic theoretical point of view, the authors of [14] present a framework based
on cloud computing middleware and a highly interconnected IoT network. Basically, the
authors claim that the IoT will be used to sense and interact with the environment with
applications from all kinds of areas (e.g. home automation, transport, community ser-
vices, operation of infrastructures, health care). The middleware will use paradigms such
as software-as-a-service, platform-as-a-service and infrastructure-as-a-service to bind the
applications and the IoT together.
SmartSantander4 is an initiative based in the city of Santander, in the north of Spain,
where IoT elements have been massively deployed as a test field for smart city projects.
As a result, researchers can experiment in an environment that takes into account real
smart city circumstances: large-scale deployment, device heterogeneity, static and mobile
sensors, real users, etc. In [15], the authors present more details about the architecture
of the system.
3"Rio Operation Center", http : //www − 03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/33303.wss
4"SmartSantander",http : //www.smartsantander.eu/
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Barcelona is taking a leadership role and has proposed CityOS 5, an operating system for
cities that aggregates modules of data processing, analytics, historical data management,
business intelligence, etc. A major objective of the smart city of Barcelona is to deploy
a system for the easy integration of third-party modules. For example, CityOS includes
the module City Service Development Kit 6 (CitySDK), which offers a set of open source
tools to aid cities in opening their data and to help developers to create digital services
for the city. Other remarkable projects included in the smart city of Barcelona are:
Sentilo7, a platform to gather urban sensor data; iCity8, a platform to incentivize third-
party projects using public information; and Open Cities9, which is a project to validate
user-centered methodologies to use open data in the public sector.
1.2 Generic smart city architecture
In general, analyzing the initiatives presented in the previous section, it can be seen that
the architecture of smart city information systems follows certain common patterns. This
section outlines these patterns, easily found in most smart cities.
First of all, ICT systems normally are deployed in a so-called silo perspective. This
means that an independent new system is designed for each infrastructure. Therefore,
cooperation and inter-connectivity among infrastructures remains very limited. Smart
city frameworks have sprung up with the goal of breaking these silos, easing applica-
tion development involving several stakeholders and providing a platform with common
services.
Secondly, smart city systems are normally designed as service oriented architectures di-
vided into three layers. The first layer includes the elements that collect information from
the city (e.g. sensors, surveillance cameras, social networks, citizen complaint applica-
tions, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems). The second layer
acts as a middleware, which provides the city with an API to connect the elements of the
first layer to the services offered in this layer. Among others, these services include rela-
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Figure 1.1: Generic smart city architecture
computing, natural language processing, business intelligence or open data. Finally, the
third layer is an application layer, in which the city council and third parties implement
applications based on data and services offered by the middle layer. A scheme of this
architecture is shown in Figure 1.1. In general, these architectures aim to maximize inter-
operability among modules with SOA, in order to encourage development of third-party
applications and to facilitate access to services and city data.
The communication channel between street sensors and smart city central servers is
represented in Figure 1.2. As shown in the figure, some WSNs are also equipped with
actuators, which can be operated from the central servers with a downlink transmission or
triggered by other first layer systems using machine-to-machine (M2M) communication.
For example, vehicle detection sensors embedded in the asphalt send information to traffic
controllers installed in traffic lights [16]. Nevertheless, principally, the infrastructure
shown in Figure 1.2 is designed to collect information generated by sensors and send
it to the city servers. The elements in this schema are part of the elements from the
first and second layers in Figure 1.1. The information flow in this schema begins in the
sensors, which gather data about their environment and then send them to a gateway.
Gateways finally deliver sensor data to the smart city premises.
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Figure 1.2: WSN data collection infrastructure
1.3 Objectives
As mentioned above, the technology deployed in smart cities has great potential as a
means of improving their economic progress, social welfare and quality of life while
ensuring a more rational and efficient approach to the way services are operated and
delivered. However, the current architecture of the information systems poses some
security challenges due to the following facts:
• The city includes many systems from different services (e.g. street lighting, garbage
collection, water supply), each of which with specific needs and requirements. Con-
sequently, the WSNs from each system are implemented with different technology
and are deployed by different providers.
• As it will be seen in Chapter 2, security solutions in the field of WSNs are usually fo-
cused on protecting scenarios with very specific characteristics. Nowadays, security
solutions for WSNs are not capable of protecting a whole system as heterogeneous
as the smart city.
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• From the point of view of the smart city administrators, outsourcing the deploy-
ment and maintenance of WSNs results in a loss of the visibility of actual effec-
tiveness of the security measures implemented in the providers’ networks.
• Due to computational power and battery constraints of sensor nodes, the WSNs
often avoid sending system status information, which hinders subsequent security
analysis.
Thus, it can be seen that the inherent characteristics of a smart city pose additional
security challenges that are not easily overcome with traditional solutions only. There-
fore, the main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the security of smart cities by
designing an intrusion detection platform for the urban WSNs. As far as we know, this
is the first research work approaching this problem in the context of smart cities, where
WSNs have become a major data source but are known to be vulnerable at the same
time. Below, details of the specific objectives of our work are given:
1. Definition of the architecture of an intrusion detection platform.
The first goal is to define the main modules of an intrusion detection platform that
is:
• capable of collecting, indexing and processing WSN data,
• scalable,
• capable of handling big data,
• transparent for the providers, and
• compatible with the existing infrastructure.
2. Definition of the pipeline of the subprocesses involved in attack detection.
Attack detection involves several subprocesses. These need to be defined and the
interactions between different subprocesses have to be identified and studied to
guarantee the sustainable and scalable execution of the pipeline.
3. Identification of suitable algorithms for an anomaly-based intrusion detection sys-
tem.
This thesis has to identify suitable algorithms for the anomaly-based intrusion
detection system, taking into account the requirements of the smart city context
and the characteristics of WSN technology.
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4. Provision of a mechanism to identify attacks.
In the case of a security incident in the WSNs, it is essential not only to detect
that the network has been compromised, but also to identify the attack and the
compromised equipment. A mechanism must be provided to guide smart city
administrators in identifying the most likely attacks.
It is worth mentioning that the study of algorithms and techniques to solve security
problems for specific smart city business cases, attack types or network configurations is
beyond the scope of this thesis. For instance, it is important to identify thresholds for
some system status variables, beyond which smart city administrators are confident that
certain WSN protocols are not working properly. It is also important to find the best
algorithms to discover malfunctions for each of the services offered by the smart city. As
these algorithms may be very different depending on the specific service, they have not
been considered in our research.
Hence, this thesis aims to contribute with generalizable solutions applicable to diverse
smart cities, different services, technologies, etc.
1.4 Research methodology
To achieve the thesis objectives, a design and creation [17] research methodology have
been applied in an incremental process, where each contribution have been sequentially
proposed and validated. For each contribution of this thesis, the five steps that this
research methodology involves have been followed: awareness, suggestion, development,
evaluation and conclusion. The first stage of the research process included identifying
the research problems. Basically, meetings were held with smart city administrators and
providers from Barcelona, literature was reviewed and technological solutions related to
WSNs and smart cities were critically evaluated. Then, we sketched and proposed solu-
tions and we developed an ICT artefact. The artefact includes models and instantiations
that were evaluated with simulations and proofs of concept. In general, in order to make
this research comparable and the simulations coherent, wide-known metrics were used
to evaluate the results and real data were used in the simulations to the extent possible.
More than 10Gb of data were gathered for several months from different urban WSNs
from Barcelona for this purpose. Finally, for each solution, the process concluded by
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identifying the main contributions to the state of the art and also pointing out future
research lines.
1.5 Contributions
This section summarizes the contributions of the thesis and the publications derived from
it.
The main contributions are:
• Identification of a research challenge relevant to smart city viability: the lack of
visibility over the WSN security issues from a holistic perspective such as the one
of the smart city administrators.
• A design of an architecture to detect intrusions in smart city WSNs that combines
two detection engines: a rule-based and an anomaly-based engines. The design
has taken into account the viability and scalability of the system in terms of data
volume and computational complexity of the subprocesses involved in the detection
pipeline.
• A comparative study of the most suitable anomaly detection techniques to discover
attacks in smart city WSNs. The study has considered the detection capabilities
of diverse algorithms and has also determined the minimum WSN data required to
obtain valid detection results.
• An attack classification schema and a procedure to analyze the security alarms
triggered by the proposed architecture to help smart city administrators to identify
attacks and compromised nodes.
The thesis contributions have been presented and published in conferences and journals.
In this introductory chapter and in the other chapters of this dissertation, we identify new
security concerns and barriers arising from smart city technological models and, more
specifically, from the adoption of WSNs as a key urban data collection system. The
analysis of these security problems was presented on 2014 at the XIII Reunión Española
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sobre Criptología y Seguridad de la Información (RECSI) 10 and it was published in [121].
RECSI is a biannual Spanish scientific congress in the field of cryptology and security in
ICT.
The main schema of the proposed architecture was described in [122] and it was presented
on 2015 at the First IEEE International Smart City Conference 11.
The results of the comparative study of anomaly detection algorithms were published
in [124], in a Special Issue of the Sensors Journal 12 on the “Security and Privacy in Sensor
Networks”. Sensors is an international, peer-reviewed journal on science and technology
of sensors and biosensors. Moreover, the results of the study were extended and the need
of gathering system status and application layer data from the WSNs in order to cover
the detection of different types of attack was shown using the technique with the best
performance in the comparative study. This was presented on 2016 at the XIV RECSI 13
and it was published in [123].
The description of the attack classification schema has been described in [125], which is
currently under review.
1.6 Thesis organization
The thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides the background for the subsequent chapters of the thesis. The
main subjects reviewed in the chapter are: big data, WSNs and intrusion detection.
• In Chapter 3, an architecture with the necessary modules to handle the require-
ments of intrusion detection in the heterogeneous context of the smart city is pro-
posed. This chapter also contains a schema of a pipeline with the main steps needed
to disclose attacks from WSN data using the proposed architecture.
• Chapter 4 contains a comparative study of several anomaly detection algorithms
to uncover popular attacks in the WSNs of the smart cities. This study has been
10“XIII Reunión Española sobre Criptología y Seguridad de la Información”,https :
//web.ua.es/recsi2014
11"First IEEE International Smart City Conference",sites.ieee.org/isc2− 2015/
12“Sensors”,http : //www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors
13“XIV Reunión Española sobre Criptología y Seguridad de la Información”,http : //recsi16.uib.es/
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carried out simulating different attacks affecting the main communication layers
and using common network metrics to perform the anomaly analysis. In this way,
the results can be generalized to other attacks affecting these same communication
layers and the techniques can be used with data from any WSN manufacturer.
• Chapter 5 contains a study of the computational complexity of the subprocesses
included in the intrusion detection pipeline presented in Chapter 3. The viability
of the proposed pipeline and the scalability of its subprocesses are analyzed. For
the most complex processes, a schema based on MapReduce is presented to prove
that the most critical components can be parallelized.
• In Chapter 6, an attack classification schema for smart city WSNs is proposed.
The schema should help smart city administrators to basically narrow down the
possible causes of the anomalies detected in the WSNs and identify compromised
network components.
• In Chapter 7, the dissertation is concluded and possible future research directions
are given.
Chapter 2
Background and related work
This chapter includes the background and related work required to frame the rest of
the chapters of this thesis. Firstly, Section 2.1 introduces big data in the context of
the smart city. Secondly, Section 2.2 gives an overview of WSNs, showing the most
typical protocols and configurations. Thirdly, Section 2.3 illustrates the most relevant
topics related to WSN security. Fourthly, Section 2.4 shows related work about intrusion
detection. Finally, Section 2.5 presents the role of the standardization organizations
related to smart cities and Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.1 Big data and the smart city
Datasets of large volume, high velocity and wide variety that cannot be processed using
traditional methods have been pointed out as big data by the 3 Vs definition [18]. Al-
though the most advanced smart cities are still in their early stages, they already have
projects collecting datasets that can be considered big data.
For instance, the Oyster card is used to access public transport in London. This system
basically registers a user’s ID, the location and a timestamp every time a citizen enters
or exits the public transportation network. A six-month sample of this dataset contains
7 million records a day, 40 million a week, 160 million a month and almost 1,000 million
every half year [19].
Nowadays, some big data properties can also be seen in smart building projects. Many
of these projects are based on measuring electrical consumption of home appliances and
13
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send the measurements to a centralized location to gather aggregated information and
improve electrical system management. These projects deal with large volume and high
velocity datasets. For example, a house collecting data from 30 appliances every minute
would send 43,000 records a day. A small city of 25,000 houses would send more than 1
billion records a day [20].
Data variety is also present in smart city datasets. Smart cities involve projects that fall
under the scope of multiple areas, such as energy efficiency, transportation, environmental
protection, etc. Each project has different needs and requirements and, therefore, diverse
types of IoT elements are used to fulfill these needs and acquire the necessary data.
This creates large-scale and very heterogeneous systems, including devices deployed in a
distributed manner that generally collect unstructured or semi-structured data.
Furthermore, other characteristics of smart cities pose obstacles to data processing and
show big data properties [21]. For example: useful data are only a small portion of all
the gathered data; data are valuable in the long term, which requires historical data
management and storage; IoT data show strong temporal and spatial correlation; etc.
The next section reviews the most popular big data management mechanisms. After-
wards, it introduces MapReduce as a basic tool to process in parallel large volumes of
data. Finally, it describes the main characteristics of security information and event
management (SIEM) systems. As it will be seen in the following chapters, these are key
components for the architecture proposed in this thesis.
2.1.1 Big data management mechanisms
In order to process, store and manage big data, it is necessary to rely on mechanisms that
go beyond traditional database management systems (DBMS). The most popular mech-
anisms to store big data are NoSQL databases (not only SQL), which can be classified
in three basic classes [21]:
• Key-value systems use data structures to store single values indexed with a
unique key. Popular products are DynamoDB 1 or Redis 2.
1“Amazon DynamoDB”, https : //aws.amazon.com/documentation/dynamodb/
2“Redis”, http : //redis.io/
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• Document-oriented databases are similar to key-value systems, but they are
capable of storing more complex structures, such as semi-structured JSON or XML
documents. MongoDB 3, SimpleDB 4 and CouchDB 5 are popular examples of this
type of databases.
• Column-oriented databases optimize storage in columns rather than in rows like
traditional DBMS. In this way, these systems are capable of scaling horizontally.
A few examples are BigTable 6, Cassandra 7 and HBase 8.
Other prominent mechanisms to store big data are implemented as file systems, such as
Google’s GFS [22] or Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [23].
2.1.2 MapReduce
Besides the storage capabilities described in the previous section, it is also necessary that
tools to manage smart city data be capable of executing processes within distributed
programming paradigms in order to make the execution scalable. The most popular
among these programming paradigms is MapReduce.
MapReduce [24] uses a divide and conquer strategy, where the programmer basically has
to implement two functions: map and reduce. In the map function, the programmer uses
input data to create an intermediate output dataset with a < key, value > structure.
The MapReduce framework sorts, groups by key and sends these intermediate datasets
to the reduce function. The programmer has to implement the reduce function to merge
data with the same key.
For instance, MapReduce can be applied to count the number of word occurrences in a
set of documents [24]. In this example, for each word in a document, map creates the
tuple < word, 1 >. The reduce function receives all the tuples grouped by key and sums
up all the values. Figure 2.1 shows a schema of this algorithm.
3“MongoDB”, https : //www.mongodb.com/
4“Amazon SimpleDB”, https : //aws.amazon.com/simpledb/
5“Apache CouchDB”, http : //couchdb.apache.org/
6“BigTable”, https : //cloud.google.com/bigtable/
7“Apache Cassandra”, http : //cassandra.apache.org/
8“Apache HBase”, https : //hbase.apache.org/
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Figure 2.1: MapReduce word count example [25].
In this way, map and reduce jobs can be parallelized using a large number of computer
clusters and, therefore, operations that can be divided into these two functions become
scalable for large datasets.
MapReduce has been used in this way in many applications. For example in [26], the
authors use this programming paradigm in three different contexts: in a movie recom-
mendation engine, in an earthquake simulator and in a large-scale processing task to
automatically georeference images.
In [20], the authors describe Scallop4SC, a hybrid architecture using HBase and MySQL 9
to store and process smart city household data with the primary purpose of performing
aggregated statistical queries in a scalable manner, such as amount of energy consumed
by air conditioning units. The authors use MapReduce for the implementation of the
data processing programs.
In [27], the authors use MapReduce as a data preprocessing method to index taxi routes
in MongoDB. Afterwards, they query MongoDB to obtain the most taken k routes in a
certain time interval.
[28] describes a big data platform deployed for Santander’s smart city project. The
platform can process semi-structured sensor data in real time with MapReduce using
CouchDB. Non-structured data from other sources, such as images or social network
posts, are processed with HDFS.
In addition, multiple new systems have emerged proposing layers of abstraction in order
to simplify programming tasks using the MapReduce programming paradigm as the
9“MySQL”, https : //www.mysql.com/
Chapter 2. Background and related work 17
basis. Generally, in these systems, users program in high-level languages and the code
gets processed and converted to MapReduce jobs. Examples of these layers are Pig 10
and Hive 11.
Furthermore, in order to facilitate enterprise-oriented data analysis with big data, some
business intelligence (BI) tools such as Pentaho 12 have developed connectors to the main
big data storage mechanisms. Along the same lines, SIEM systems are data analysis
platforms focused on information security. Logically, SIEMs are relevant tools in the
context of the present thesis, so the next section briefly reviews their most important
characteristics.
2.1.3 Security information and event management
Security information and event management systems are designed for log management,
IT regulatory compliance, event correlation, active response and endpoint security[29].
SIEMs contribute to the security administration of organizations by gathering and corre-
lating security information of several types, formats and sources into a single system. As
a result, administrators may leave behind traditional analysis using security mechanisms
in a silo perspective. With a SIEM, security practitioners carry out complex monitoring
and incident inquiries involving multiple devices and protection mechanisms. Popular
SIEM tools are: Splunk 13, AlientVault Open Source SIEM (OSSIM) 14, HPE Security
ArcSight 15 and IBM Security QRadar SIEM 16.
For this thesis, the most relevant capabilities of SIEMs are the storage of large datasets
and high-velocity data collection. In general, SIEM systems can index big data running
as standalone platforms or they can be configured as a top-layer data analysis tool
connected to one of the storage mechanisms described in Section 2.1.1. For instance,
10“Pig”, https : //pig.apache.org/
11“Hive”, https : //hive.apache.org/
12“Pentaho”, http : //www.pentaho.com/
13"Splunk", http : //www.splunk.com
14"AlientVault Open Source SIEM (OSSIM)", http : //www.alienvault.com/open − threat −
exchange/projects
15"HPE Security ArcSight", http : //www8.hp.com/us/en/software − solutions/siem − security −
information− event−management/
16"IBM Security QRadar SIEM", http : //www− 03.ibm.com/software/products/en/qradar− siem
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Splunk offers indexing and parallel processing capabilities to handle large datasets [30],
but it also offers connectors to big data mechanisms, for example Hadoop Connect 17.
Furthermore, SIEM systems provide tools to capture data from remote locations or
locally. These tools are commonly capable of parsing, compressing, securely processing
and sending data from the source to the server. For example, OSSIM offers Collectors
to classify and normalize events gathered in other external systems [31].
2.2 Wireless sensor networks
Now that the main characteristics of big data management systems and the suitability of
SIEMs for processing security-related data have been reviewed, this section sets the focus
on the WSN technology that is used to gather these data. This section first gives a general
overview of the different technologies enabling this type of network (Section 2.2.1). Then,
the subsequent sections briefly describe the most important layers in the communication
stack: the physical layer in Section 2.2.2, the data link layer in Section 2.2.3, the network
layer in Section 2.2.4 and the application layer in Section 2.2.5.
2.2.1 General overview
Wireless sensor networks are networks that communicate using wireless technology,
where nodes, also known as motes, are equipped with one or several sensors to capture
information about their environment. When the motes are also equipped with actuators
that enable them to perform a certain action, then these networks are known as wireless
sensor and actuator networks (WSAN).
In smart cities, it is common for motes to have autonomous cooperative communication to
send values read by their sensors to a device at the edge of the WSN known as the gateway
or base station. Gateways are equipped with several communication interfaces with the
aim of transmitting WSN data to the smart city data centers through a conventional
and reliable network (e.g. Internet).
17"Hadoop Connect",http : //www.splunk.com/enus/solutions/solution−areas/big−data/splunk−
hadoop− connect.html
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Figure 2.2: Range and throughput comparison among wireless technologies [32].
There are multiple types of wireless communication protocols that build different kinds
of wireless networks. Figure 2.2 compares the most important technologies according
to their range and throughput. Basically, the most relevant WSN technologies in smart
cities are:
• Wireless personal area networks (WPAN) are low-power, low-throughput, short-
range (up to few meters) wireless networks that are based on the standard IEEE
802.15. Relevant technologies included in this category are ZigBee, IPv6 over Low
power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) and Bluetooth. There are
many use cases in smart cities using these protocols. For instance, ZigBee is used
in [33] to control street lighting.
• Wireless local area networks (WLAN), such as Wi-Fi, provide low-range but broad-
throughput wireless networks. Some cities, like San Jose in California [34], deploy
Wi-Fi connectivity on the streets not only to offer Internet to citizens, but also to
connect IoT elements that require larger bandwidth than the usual sensor applica-
tions, such as IP-based traffic cameras.
• Wireless metropolitan area networks (WMAN) follow IEEE 802.16 standards. Pro-
tocols following these family of standards are popularly known as WiMAX. This
technology is mainly used for applications requiring large deployments (up to 25
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Figure 2.3: WSN communication topologies
km) and non-restringed throughput (< 150 Mb/s). In [35], the authors propose
to use WiMAX for smart grid projects.
• Low-power wide-area networks (LPWAN) are low-power, long-range (up to 10 km),
low-throughput (<5 Kb/s) wireless networks [36]. SigFox 18 and LoRaWAN 19 are
the most popular technologies at the moment. Both technologies have been used
in many smart parking applications [37].
Among these types of network, WPAN are considered especially vulnerable. These are
made of low-power devices and short-range communication modules, which rely in many
cases on multi-hop capabilities to build an extensive network and deliver packets from the
most remote nodes to the base station. Besides, motes are frequently battery-powered
and, therefore, are designed also with restringed processing capacity to save power.
Therefore, this thesis focuses on this type of WSN to perform attacks and intrusion
analysis. However, results are generalizable to the other types of WSN.
As mentioned above, many WSNs rely on multi-hop capabilities to deliver packets from
one end of the network to the other end. This allows three basic topologies shown in
Figure 2.3: star, tree and mesh. These topologies can include three types of nodes:
gateways, motes with routing capabilities and leaf motes. Gateways and routing nodes
consume large amounts of energy-forwarding packets and, thereby, they are generally
plugged into the electrical grid. However, leaf nodes can be battery-powered, because
their sole responsibility is sensing the environment and sending their own packets towards
the gateway.
18“SigFox”,https : //www.sigfox.com/
19“LoRaWAN”,https : //www.lora− alliance.org/
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The following sections summarize the responsibilities of the most relevant layers in the
communication stack for WSNs. These are the physical, data link, network and applica-
tion layers.
2.2.2 Physical layer
The physical layer handles the way that bits are transmitted over the medium (the
air in WSNs). Thus, its main responsibilities include defining operating frequencies,
modulation, carrier sense, bit rate, etc. In ZigBee and 6LoWPAN this layer is defined
by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [38].
2.2.3 Data link layer
The data link layer is responsible for transferring data between adjacent nodes in a
network. In WSNs, the media access control (MAC) sublayer is of particular importance.
This sublayer organizes the network nodes so that the transmission medium is accessed
in an ordered manner, which allows for correct communication. As with the physical
layer, the MAC layer is also defined by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [38].
According to this standard, nodes can take the role of a full-function device (FFD), which
has routing capabilities, or the role of a reduced-function device (RFD), which limits the
nodes to just transmit their own data. In this way, two types of topologies are possible
in this layer: star and peer-to-peer. In a star topology, a single FFD receives messages
from several FFDs or RFDs. In a peer-to-peer topology, several FFDs can communicate
with each other. It is important to note that FFDs normally consume more energy than
RFDs and, therefore, generally, they cannot be battery-powered.
Regarding media access, protocols use two main types of strategies. On the one hand,
protocols based on time division multiple access (TDMA) divide time in slots and trans-
mitters reserve a slot before transmitting. This type of protocol requires beacons to
synchronize transmitters and receivers. In other types of protocols, however, nodes can-
not reserve slots, but they are provided with a mechanism to effectively transmit packets
without creating interference on communications from the other nodes in the network.
For example, carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) basically
specifies that, before transmitting, a node needs to sense the medium and simply start a
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transmission if the channel is free. In [39], authors analyze multiple MAC protocols for
WSNs.
Furthermore, IEEE 802.15.4 standard also defines data verification (i.e. cyclic redun-
dancy check (CRC)) and security mechanisms to ensure data confidentiality, authenticity
and replay protection in single link communications.
2.2.4 Network layer
The network layer enables multi-hop network topologies. Nodes implementing this layer
can become intermediaries, developing routing capabilities and forwarding packets from
other nodes. In WPAN, there are two main standards for embedded systems that include
the specification for a network layer: ZigBee (protocol stack shown in Figure 2.4) and
6LoWPAN (protocol stack shown in Figure 2.5).
As shown in the figures, these standards define all the necessary layers in the communi-
cation stack. Although it is not mandatory, both protocols are defined on top of IEEE
802.15.4. Both offer typical network services, such as neighbor discovery, route discovery,
addressing, routing, etc. ZigBee [40] has been proposed by the ZigBee Alliance 20 and
more information can be found in [40].
6LoWPAN has been defined by the IETF 21 in [41]. This protocol definition proposes an
interoperability layer to send IPv6 packets over low-power and lossy networks. Thus, this
protocol is easily integrable with conventional networks: gateways are simple; the same
network addressing space can be used; and protocols above IP, such as User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) or Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), are compatible.
The network layer contains multiple protocols to deal with the different responsibilities
of the layer. For example, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [43] is a very
popular routing protocol that not only can be used in ZigBee and 6LoWPAN, but also
in other mobile networks.
20“ZigBee Alliance”, http : //www.zigbee.org/
21“IETF”, https : //www.ietf.org/
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Figure 2.4: ZigBee communication stack [40].
Figure 2.5: 6LoWPAN communication stack [42].
2.2.5 Application layer
The application layer is on top of the communication stack. In this layer, application-
specific operations are implemented. Furthermore, the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP) [44] has emerged as a protocol similar to Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
for the conventional Internet. CoAP works over UDP, it supports the Representational
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State Transfer (ReST) methods of HTTP, and it provides subscription and push notifi-
cations. Thus, CoAP provides an interoperable constrained application protocol for the
IoT.
2.3 WSN security
This section reviews attacks on WSNs (Section 2.3.1) and it also provides basic counter-
measures that have been proposed against these attacks (Section 2.3.2).
2.3.1 Attacks on WSNs
The limited computational and energetic constraints of nodes are an obstacle to applying
conventional computer network security countermeasures in WSNs. Furthermore, in
these networks, nodes become more vulnerable when they are placed in unprotected
environments like streets. In these circumstances, attackers can easily capture nodes,
access confidential information in their memory (e.g. cryptographic keys) and reprogram
their behavior. It is also common that attackers benefit from the wireless nature of the
communications to intercept the messages or to obstruct frequency bands to impede
the proper reception of some packets. In [45, 46], the authors survey the most popular
attacks on WSNs. In the next sections, the most outstanding attacks affecting each of
the layers of the communication protocols are reviewed.
2.3.1.1 Attacks against the physical layer
• Data tampering: Data in transit between two nodes are modified.
• Node tampering: A node is captured in order to damage it or to extract infor-
mation from its memory.
• Node replication: New nodes are added to the network by copying nodes that
are already legitimate network members.
• Jamming: Attackers send a high-power signal in order to generate interference
and avoid correct reception of legitimate packets.
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2.3.1.2 Attacks against the data link layer
• Sybil: A node takes several identities to change the behavior of data link protocols.
This has consequences for communication protocols relying on data aggregation
(i.e. in order to forward fewer packets, intermediate nodes aggregate received data
from several nodes and send a new packet with the aggregated data) or on voting
(i.e. intermediate nodes make decisions, such as deciding the best link, according
to the votes casted by other nodes).
• Interrogation: Attackers exploit MAC protocols based on a two-way handshake
(e.g. protocols that send control packets, such as Ready To Send (RTS) and Clear
To Send (CTS)). Attackers send many RTS, so that listening nodes answer with a
CTS for each received RTS and, therefore, consume resources.
• Exhaustion: Attackers constantly occupy the communication channel. Thereby,
legitimate nodes using carrier sense protocols (which are used before transmitting
to check whether the transmission medium is free) get their transmissions delayed
or even canceled.
• Collision: Attackers create interference during legitimate transmissions. In this
way, checksum mechanisms discard received messages and transmitters have to
resend messages.
• Unfairness: Persistence on attacks such as exhaustion or collision in order to
highly decrease quality of service and create a total or partial Denial of Service
(DoS).
2.3.1.3 Attacks against the network layer
• Sleep deprivation: Attackers generate a lot of traffic by means of broadcast pack-
ets or by creating network loops in order to keep many nodes awake re-transmitting
packets.
• Internet smurf: Attackers impersonate a node and then they send multiple
ECHO requests in broadcast. ECHO replays saturate the impersonated victim.
• Misdirection: Attackers with routing capabilities forward packets towards links
where the final destination is not reachable.
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• Acknowledgement spoofing: Attackers impersonate a legitimate node and send
Acknowledgement (ACK) packets indicating reception of incorrectly received pack-
ets. This keeps transmitters from re-sending the packets.
• Spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information: Routing information
sent between legitimate nodes is captured, changed and re-sent in order to create
loops, attracting traffic to target nodes, segmenting the network, etc.
• Wormhole: A low-latency transmission channel is created between two far-apart
attackers. The attacker located at greater distance from the base station benefits
from better communications than its neighbors to obtain better routing metrics.
Therefore, this attacker becomes the best routing node in the area and attracts
traffic.
• Sybil: Attackers take diverse identities from legitimate nodes. Then, attackers
can mislead other routing nodes to change the routing path towards or away from
the impersonated nodes.
• Selective forwarding and blackhole: Attackers in a routing position discard
some (selective forwarding) or all (blackhole) packets from certain nodes.
• Hello flood: Attackers use a powerful transmitter to send HELLO messages to
join the network to a large amount of nodes. Listener nodes reply to this fake
request with futile messages.
• Sinkhole: Some nodes in an area are misled to believe that either a target node
or an attacker is the best routing link. In the first case, the target node has to
consume extra resources forwarding packets. In the second case, the attacker starts
forwarding packets from many nodes and, therefore, can perform other attacks,
such as selective forwarding.
• Homing: Traffic and network analysis is performed in order to determine key
network nodes. These nodes become the best candidates for other attacks.
2.3.1.4 Attacks against the transport layer
• De-synchronization: First, attackers impersonate a legitimate node. Then, they
request retransmission of properly transmitted packets in a legitimate connection
Chapter 2. Background and related work 27
established with another node in the network. In this way, legitimate nodes misuse
their resources in futile re-transmissions.
• Flooding: Attackers repeatedly send connection requests to other nodes, so that
these reserve and exhaust their resources.
2.3.1.5 Attacks against the application layer
• Deluge: Attackers take advantage of over-the-air systems to remotely reprogram
nodes.
• Path-based DoS:Duplicated application packets are injected in leaf nodes. Thereby,
packets are forwarded up to the base station, where they are discarded. This is
resource-consuming and prevents other nodes from sending their packets.
• Overwhelm: Over-stimulation of sensors in leaf nodes to generate large amounts
of packets traversing and saturating multiple paths.
• Eavesdropping: Attackers read packets transmitted between two legitimate nodes.
• Re-play: Attackers re-transmit already sent legitimate packets.
2.3.2 Basic countermeasures
As Table 2.1 shows, the attacks mentioned in the previous section can be used to compro-
mise data confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation. In order to protect
networks against these attacks, researchers have proposed many countermeasures [45,
46]. This section discusses the main protection mechanisms found in the literature.
Basically, confidentiality attacks have two main origins: physically accessing node mem-
ory or eavesdropping on wireless transmissions. In smart city WSNs, physical access is
easy in many cases since sensor nodes are deployed unprotected in the streets. Tamper-
resistant hardware is a strong countermeasure in this case. However, for most smart city
services it is too expensive to be implemented in all the nodes. Other more economical
alternatives have been proposed: code obfuscation and code attestation [47]. In code
obfuscation, some techniques are used to make code and data more difficult to read,
increasing, thereby, the amount of time required to perform an attack. Code attestation
is used to check if running code has been altered.
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Confidentiality problems due to the wireless nature of WSNs are normally tackled with
cryptographic solutions. Since the first WSN nodes were designed with minimum pro-
cessing power, legacy systems based on these networks are incapable of running any
cryptographic algorithm. However, in the last few years, manufacturers have developed
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more powerful nodes and new protocols have been designed to take into account crypto-
graphic requirements. For example, the specification of the most popular communication
protocols for WSN, e.g. IEEE 802.15.4 standard [38] and ZigBee [40], include different
security modes based on symmetric cryptography. Asymmetric cryptography has also
been proposed for some situations. In [48], the authors propose to implement asymmet-
ric cryptography through a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol for WSNs. Libelium 22
proposes using symmetric cryptography for data exchange, and then regularly renewing
the cryptographic keys using asymmetric cryptography with RSA 1024 [49].
Cryptography is also a mechanism to avoid integrity and non-repudiation attacks. Check-
sums and message authentication codes are the usual countermeasures to impede unno-
ticed modifications of packets in transit. The destination node of an altered packet
discards it if the received packet and the code generated by the message integrity mecha-
nism do not match. However, integrity attacks are hardly noticed by city administrators,
since most WSNs do not send information to the base station indicating the reasons why
packets are dropped. Thereby, from the centralized point of view of smart city admin-
istrators, the traces of this type of attack can be assimilated to the traces of attacks
against data availability.
Availability attacks normally focus on breaking communication in certain areas and de-
pleting node batteries. Although there are solutions in the literature to avoid this type
of attacks, they are not always effective or applicable. For instance, frequency hopping
spread spectrum [50] is used to avoid certain types of jamming attacks by constantly
changing the transmission channel within the frequency band of the protocol. However,
jammer devices currently available on the market can jam all the channels used by several
protocols at the same time.
Hence, it can be seen that attacks can succeed and impact data confidentiality, integrity,
availability and non-repudiation. Although there are countermeasures to stop or at least
slow down the attacks, in this context security barriers are often penetrable. Therefore,
the best mitigation approach is a good detection strategy. Even though much infor-
mation to identify attacks is already lost when it reaches the smart city data centers,
it is important at the very least to detect that the networks are under attack in order
to increase the strength of the applied security measures and push WSN providers to
22“Libelium”,http : //www.libelium.com/
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improve their network security. Indeed, in a smart city context, discovering that certain
WSN components are under attack is notably important, since many of the components
are shared among different networks (e.g. gateways). Thus, some attacks do not stay
isolated in a single system and can have consequences for several services and providers.
Next section describes intrusion detection techniques that can be used from the smart
city centralized point of view to analyze WSN data and point out attacks.
2.4 Intrusion detection
Within the research field of intrusion detection, two types of techniques can be distin-
guished: misuse detection and anomaly detection. Whereas the former looks for traces
left by the attackers in the security data (e.g. system logs), the latter analyzes the normal
behavior of the system and points out unusual changes.
Intrusion detection techniques looking for misuses rely on an extensive database of attack
signatures. An attack signature is a sequence of typical actions that can be recorded
in a security log. The signature can be used to identify an attacker’s attempt to ex-
ploit a known network, operating system or application vulnerability. Alarms are raised
when the detection system discovers a sequence of events that matches any of the signa-
tures [51]. The main advantage of this type of detection is the low rate of false positives.
In the context of WSNs in smart cities, signature-based detection is useful in identifying
attacks targeting networks with regular behavior (e.g. environmental sensors sending
readings every day at the same hour) or highly reliable services. Simple rules can be
created in these two cases to trigger alerts when the expected readings are not received
or when a certain number of packets are lost. Nonetheless, many smart city services do
not follow a regular pattern and WSN is an unreliable technology, where some packets
are occasionally not delivered.
Alternatively, intrusion detection techniques looking for anomalies are able to identify
changes in the system that do not match the normal behavior. Given the significance of
this type of intrusion detection for this thesis, next section provides more details about
it.
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2.4.1 Anomaly detection
Anomaly detection has been widely used in many application domains (see a survey on
anomaly detection techniques in [52]). The most common techniques fall into the scope of
statistics, clustering and machine learning. Depending on the types of samples necessary
to process the data, these techniques are divided into supervised, semi-supervised or
unsupervised.
Supervised techniques require a training dataset with labels indicating the category of
each sample (e.g. "no attack", "jamming" or "selective forwarding"). Then, a model
is generated to classify new unlabeled samples into one of the defined categories. Semi-
supervised techniques require a training dataset with samples of a single category in
order to create a model that classifies new samples as belonging to that category or not.
Finally, unsupervised techniques do not require labeled training data and are capable of
dividing a dataset into various subsets without a previously learnt model.
Furthermore, anomaly detection algorithms are also clearly separable between univariate
algorithms (only one variable is used in the analysis) and multivariate algorithms (several
variables are used in the analysis). In univariate algorithms, computing a higher and a
lower bound beyond which data are considered anomalous is common. As an example,
Tukey’s method [53] is popular for computing these boundaries from a numeric dataset.
In this method, two types of boundaries are defined: the inner fences and the outer
fences. The former are computed by subtracting and adding 1.5 times the interquartile
distance of the dataset (i.e. distance between the first and the third quartile) to the first
and the third quartiles respectively. This defines very strict thresholds, which implies a
high probability of identifying some normal instances as outliers. Outer fences represent
a more loose way to define the boundaries. The outer fences are computed by subtracting
and adding 3 times the interquartile distance to the first and the third quartiles respec-
tively. In order to compute the boundaries with this method, it is recommended that
the large datasets not be highly skewed.
Another way to compute thresholds with univariate algorithms is using autoregressive
models [54], such as autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA). These models
are based upon the assumption that each value is somehow correlated with the previous
recorded values. In this way, autoregressive models use previous values to predict future
values within a confidence interval. The lower and higher boundary in the interval can
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be used as thresholds to point out anomalies. Autoregressive models are very common
in time series analysis.
Multivariate anomaly detection is generally handled by machine learning and clustering
techniques. Widely used algorithms are support vector machines [55], nearest neigh-
bor [56] and local outlier factor [57].
Depending on the characteristics of the specific scenario and on the requirements of the
application, some algorithms perform better than others. For instance, the authors of [58]
compare several unsupervised approaches based on local outlier factor, near neighbors,
Mahalanobis distance and support vector machines to detect intrusions in conventional
computer networks. Their experiments show that the local outlier factor approach is the
most adequate in this context.
Anomaly detection has been also used in intrusion detection systems (IDS) for WSNs.
In [59], the authors survey the most popular techniques. Generally, the nodes that con-
tain IDS components gather and/or analyze network status data concerning anomalous
operation activities of their neighbors. When this occurs, the nodes trigger an alarm at
the base station.
Anomaly detection techniques have been applied in multiple applications related to
WSNs. As an example, the authors of [60] use geostatistics and time series analysis
to detect outliers in readings of meteorological sensors. The authors select temporal and
spatial real-data-based outlier detection (TSOD) as the most appropriate technique in
this context. In their experiments, the authors claim that TSOD has a high performance
and it is able to identify all the outliers with a low false positive rate, around 3%. How-
ever, these techniques are only applicable to certain scenarios in which there exists a
spatio-temporal correlation and the WSN is dense enough.
Other studies focus on anomaly detection applied to single sensors. By way of example, in
[61], the authors propose a two-phased algorithm. In the first phase, the algorithm seeks
temporal anomalies with one-class support vector machines (OC-SVM) and, in the second
phase, the algorithm reduces false positives and classifies the anomalies with a supervised
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) approach. For the first phase, the authors compare OC-
SVM with other techniques (i.e. logistic regression, random forest, linear support vector
classification, complexity invariant distance-based KNN and Euclidean distance-based
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KNN). The authors conclude that OC-SVM outperforms the other techniques, achieving
a 96% detection rate in their experiments.
In [62], Mahalanobis distance is used to detect insider attacks with high detection ac-
curacy and robustness (i.e. the false positive rate stays low even though the number of
outlying sensors increases). Some authors claim that anomaly detection techniques based
on the distance to the neighbors should not be used in WSN due to high computational
complexity [63]. Nevertheless, from the point of view of smart city administrators, these
techniques can be considered because anomaly analysis can be computed in data centers
using powerful computers.
In [64], the authors use one-class quarter-sphere support vector machines in two new
anomaly detection algorithms: lightweight anomaly detection algorithm using sort and
lightweight anomaly detection algorithm using quick select. These algorithms are suitable
to run in constrained nodes due to their low computational complexity. Moreover, their
experiments show a high performance, e.g. a 95% true positive rate and a false positive
rate of below 10%.
The authors of [65] use an improved ARIMA model to predict anomalies in WSN through
network traffic analysis in the nodes. The experiments in the article show an accuracy
of over 96% and a false positive rate of less than 3%.
Although some of the previously mentioned anomaly detection techniques and IDS per-
form well in detecting attacks, they are not a generalizable solution in an heterogeneous
context such as the smart city. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, some
techniques excessively depend on the context of the WSN. On the other hand, IDS are
normally designed ad-hoc to be embedded in some or all of the nodes of specific WSNs.
Therefore, IDS can only be considered as a first protection mechanism to be imple-
mented by WSN providers for their specific networks. From the centralized perspective
of smart city administration, the solution must not require access to the WSN nodes nor
knowledge of the specific technology used by each external provider.
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2.5 The role of standards
With the aim of contributing to smart city construction in a progressive, incremental and
scalable manner, leading standardization corporations have started to write guides and
regulations. These documents are generally written based on principles of consensus,
openness, transparency and non-discrimination. Taking these into account, standards
about smart cities are written with the main purposes of improving interoperability
among components, promoting secure ways of sharing data, easing entrance to new ap-
plication development players, removing commercial monopolies, reducing costs, etc. [66]
Although, nowadays, the drafting of such texts is immature and it does still not cover all
areas, there are already some relevant documents related to the smart city. For instance,
ISO 37120 [67] describes a suite of indicators to measure and compare different city
services in a verifiable manner. ITU-T Y.4400 series [68] offers a terminological guide
about ICT for sustainable smart cities and ITU-T L.1600 series [69] is similar to ISO
37120 and lists ICT key performance indicators.
Local standardization organizations are also contributing with documentation. The
British Standards Institution (BSI)23 has published guides to facilitate data interop-
erability[70] and to improve planning and smart city development[71]. In the Spanish
sphere, AEN/CTN 178 an AENOR24 working group has published a set of standards
about smart cities. Among them are some related to ICT: UNE 178102-1:2015 [72]
on multiservice city networks; UNE 178104:2015 [73] on integrated systems for smart
city management; UNE 178107-4:2015 IN [74] on access and transport in WSNs; UNE
178301:2015 [75] on open data.
Beyond traditional standardization organizations, it is also important to highlight some
of the initiatives and contributions of other entities. For example, the City Protocol
Society 25 is a community of cities, companies, academia and nonprofit organizations
with the aim of offering recommendations, technical information and use cases as a model
for other cities. The Open & Agile Smart Cities initiative 26 involves 89 cities from 19
countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. This initiative recommends the
adoption of: a driven-by-implementation approach, where communities and developers
23"British Standards Institution", http://www.bsigroup.com
24"AENOR", http://www.aenor.es/
25"City Protocol Society", http : //cityprotocol.org
26"Open & Agile Smart Cities initiative", http : //oascities.org
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work together creating services; a technical API; a data model set; and an open data
platform.
In general, it can be seen that the standards published to date do not deal with security
in depth, since none provide a solution to the above mentioned problems derived from
the heterogeneous context, externalized services, and so on.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that traditional security protocols are necessary to protect smart
city subsystems from different types of attacks. These solutions are generally designed by
embedding in the WSNs some countermeasures based on cryptography, code obfuscation
and frequency hopping, among others. However, existing solutions cannot holistically
cover highly heterogeneous environments with multiple and diverse network technologies
and communication protocols. To respond to the needs of this type of system, this thesis
proposes to use intrusion detection techniques based on signatures and also on anomaly
analysis. In the following chapters, a schema of the architecture will be defined to
integrate these detection techniques, and a study of the most suitable anomaly detection
algorithms for smart city WSNs will be performed. Finally, a classification system will
also be proposed to assist smart city administrators in recognizing the specific attacks
in the case of a network compromise.
Chapter 3
Architecture
The previous chapters have shown how smart city systems increase interconnectivity
among infrastructures, and create new ways to spread vulnerabilities and to exploit
infrastructure dependencies, causing damage to third parties. We have also seen that
WSNs are basic components for gathering urban data, but, at the same time, they use
technology which is less reliable and easier to attack than conventional networks. In
order to achieve rapid deployment of WSNs and smart city technology, cities have taken
advantage of services procured from external providers; this outsourcing of public services
has, however, raised security-related concerns. Basically, we have observed that smart
city administrators have lost control over the network devices, and the visibility over the
WSNs to identify potential security issues has decreased.
Moreover, it is not feasible to design security strategies and countermeasures applicable
to all types of WSNs that can be deployed in a city. Although smart cities are still in their
inception, their rapid growth has led to the deployment of state of the art technology in
a new field (i.e. the city), in a manner that makes it hard to apply universal security
solutions to the WSNs. The following characteristics of smart cities are the three main
impediments to deploy generalizable solutions:
• Heterogeneity: Multiple providers implement different technological solutions,
under diverse security requirements. Traditional security measures cannot be ap-
plied to WSNs, and WSN countermeasures do not cover all circumstances.
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• Limited access: Providers usually restrain public administrations from accessing
their equipment. Accordingly, thorough security analysis in the WSNs can only be
performed by the providers. Nevertheless, smart city managers are the only actors
with information from all the providers and services. Therefore, incidents involving
multiple providers or provoking cascading effects can only be studied by the smart
city managers.
• Difficulty to update: System updates become very costly and sometimes even
impossible in WSNs, because some networks do not offer a downlink communica-
tion channel from the data centers to the sensors and, therefore, sensors have to
be physically access in order to update their software. Hence, newly discovered
vulnerabilities in WSNs frequently go unpatched once they have been deployed.
Therefore, there are currently no security solutions that smart city administrators can
use to successfully manage WSN security in a holistic manner. Thus, the main security
barriers are implemented and controlled only by the providers. In this thesis, we propose
to improve WSN security in smart cities with an intrusion detection platform for the
smart city administrators. In this way, WSN data sent by the providers can be analyzed
looking for attacks and other failures and, therefore, smart city administrators can push
providers to implement the most adequate security countermeasures in their networks.
This chapter presents an architecture for this platform. The proposed architecture is en-
visaged as an additional layer in the smart city architecture above the elements deployed
by the providers. Thereby, the architecture is transparent for the providers, it does not
add extra requirements for the WSN nodes, which are very limited in terms of processing
power and battery, and it is compatible with the WSNs that are already deployed on the
streets.
This chapter presents the main requirements for the architecture in Section 3.1. Then,
Section 3.2 gives an overview of the proposed architecture. Section 3.3 discusses the
major considerations of designing an anomaly-based detection engine, which is one of
the principal components of the proposed architecture. Section 3.4 provides a schema
with the most relevant subprocesses involved in the intrusion detection pipeline, from
data reception at the central server to the generation of alarms due to detected anomalies.
Finally, Section 3.5 presents a use case based on a public car park as proof of concept of
the architecture.
Chapter 3. Architecture 38
3.1 Main architecture requirements
A generic platform to detect intrusions in smart city WSNs has to be designed from the
point of view of the smart city administrators. Firstly, this means taking into account
that smart city administrators have a centralized perspective. Hence, the architecture
has to be capable of collecting and processing a large amount of unstructured and semi-
structured data sent by urban WSNs. Secondly, it entails avoiding the barriers related
with the high heterogeneity and the limited access of the systems and the difficulties
in updating them. Finally, the architecture has to be transparent for external WSN
providers. This makes it compatible with already deployed networks and with the low
processing capabilities of some sensor nodes.
Regarding data processing requirements, this can be considered in a big data context.
The architecture has to be ready to collect, index, and process a large volume of data
with high velocity and variety. We assume that smart cities have, in their central servers,
high computational power, a large amount of storage space, and the other hardware and
network requirements necessary to deploy big data solutions.
As seen in Section 2.1, a principal characteristic of smart cities is that their data are highly
heterogeneous and distributed. The proposed architecture has to take into account these
characteristics and it has to be able to acquire data from diverse source types.
3.2 Architecture overview
This section takes into account the requirements presented in the previous section and
outlines a centralized architecture to collect WSN data and to process them with a
hybrid detection engine combining a rule-based and an anomaly-based engine to disclose
incidents in the third-party WSNs.
The proposed solution, shown in Figure 3.1, is based on an enhanced SIEM system (See
Section 2.1.3) contained within the city council facilities in order to make use of the
collection, storage, processing and big data services offered by the smart city. The main
components and the data flow represented in the figure are:
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of the proposed solution
1. Data originate from several sources in different data types. Generally, appli-
cation data come from the sensor readings and network status data come from
gateways, watchdogs[76] or other devices with enough capacity to monitor WSNs.
In certain cases, in order to get a precise picture of the network, WSN nodes log
system status information, which is sent regularly or on request[77, 78]. These
data, then, are gathered, parsed and normalized by remote data collectors dis-
tributed near the sources, or by centralized data collectors installed near the
processing engines.
2. Normalized data are the input of the two detection engines. On the one hand, there
is the rule-based detection engine, the objective of which is to detect known
attacks and to correlate data from different sources, and, on the other hand, the
anomaly-based detection engine, which uses machine learning and statistical
techniques for the detection of anomalies and unknown attacks.
3. The detection engines independently analyze the input data and trigger alarms
that are stored in a common alarm database.
4. Alarms from the database are correlated by the rule-based detection engine gen-
erating new alarms, which are more reliable, have higher priority and become
candidates for correlation in future iterations.
5. The administration and visualization tools offer interfaces (e.g. dashboards,
SMS alerts) and subscription mechanisms to provide information about the alarms
and to manage the system.
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Our solution deploys a new layer in the servers of smart city administrators. This layer
is conceptually above the devices used by the different providers. Therefore, it is not
affected by the heterogeneity of the different configurations, it does not require special
permissions over third-party devices and it is easily accessible and updatable.
Moreover, a SIEM is the core of the architecture and, as seen in Section 2.1.3, this
type of system is capable of processing big data as required and it offers mechanisms
to collect data from local and remote locations suitable for deployment in a smart city
context. Concerning WSNs, data can be found stored in smart city servers or in remote
devices on the streets. Sensor readings, for example, are normally of value to specific city
departments. These data, therefore, are generally stored in a conventional server and
they can be accessed within the smart city premises. However, system status data (e.g.
device logs), which may not be relevant to any other smart city department, have to
be directly gathered from the WSNs. Therefore, the proposed SIEM-based architecture
is capable of gathering remote and local data using different data collectors, and it
offers a centralized single platform on which to process and correlate all the information
together. Furthermore, data correlation and historical data management, which are
generally very relevant in intrusion detection analysis, are especially efficient on this
type of platform. Finally, parallel programming paradigms, such as MapReduce, are
a normal characteristic of SIEM systems. In Chapter 5, we take advantage of these
paradigms to deal with complex intrusion detection algorithms managing large amounts
of data in a scalable manner.
Regarding the intrusion detection characteristics of the proposed architecture, two situ-
ations are covered. Firstly, the rule-based detection engine is capable of finding patterns
in the data to identify attacks that have already been reported in the literature and that
are known to information security researchers. Secondly, the anomaly-based detection
engine is capable of warning administrators in the case of situations that do not follow
normal system behavior, although there are no patterns matching known attacks. In
this way, popular attacks can be easily identified and prevented, and new attacks, ex-
ploiting unknown vulnerabilities, trigger alarms that give smart city administrators the
first warning signs in order to start more in-depth inquiries. Additionally, at the time
of creating an alarm, administrators can associate a severity level to the alarm and also
assign an action to execute as soon as the alarm is triggered.
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The following sections describe the basic WSN data available at the central servers that
can be used by the detection engines to disclose security incidents. Then, more details
about the two detection engines are given.
3.2.1 Data types
The following are the most relevant types of data that are received from the WSN at the
smart city data centers. Some examples of how they can be used to detect intrusions are
provided:
• Basic information about the nodes: ID, latitude, longitude, etc. The ge-
ographical position is a basic parameter to determine the area affected by the
attacks.
• Basic information about the WSN: service purpose (e.g. parking, environ-
mental monitoring), communication protocol (e.g. ZigBee, LoRa), etc. From this
information, other information about the WSN can be extracted. For example,
ZigBee has two possible topologies (i.e. tree and star) and its frequency bands in
Europe are either 868 MHz or 2.4 GHz. This information can be used to discard
possible attacks against a service and to cluster data.
• Basic information about the packets: packet number, gateway ID, times-
tamps, etc. Additional fields can be computed from this basic information, such
as the one-way delay (OWD), which indicates the time taken by the packets from
the sensor nodes to the server. This is an important field for the detection of some
attacks, such as DoS, since these attacks tend to slow down packet reception.
• Basic information about system status: received signal strength indicator
(RSSI), signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), etc. Some attacks have a direct impact on
some of these variables. For instance, attacks generating interference impact RSSI.
• Information about the services: sensor readings, service data aggregated in
time intervals, etc. These data are sent either in scheduled regular time intervals
(e.g. environmental data) or when sensors have reacted to an environmental condi-
tion (e.g. parking activity). Anomalies in these data can indicate badly calibrated
sensors and data integrity attacks.
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• Battery status: The objective of many WSN attacks is to exhaust sensor bat-
teries. Therefore, this information is very useful for the detection of this type of
attack.
3.2.2 Rule-based detection engine
The rule-based detection engine provides the system with an alarm module capable of
identifying attacks that are recorded as signatures in a database. The rules that define
the signatures in the database specify the traces that have to appear in the data in order
to trigger an alarm. Additionally, alarms are implemented setting up a schedule, a level
of severity and the actions to execute (e.g. administrator warning, execution of certain
processes).
Rules are built with two purposes; firstly, to find evidence of undesirable situations (e.g.
traces of refused connections, parameters surpassing a threshold). Secondly, rules are
also built to correlate multiple pieces of evidence found in different network components
and/or moments in time. The correlation rules take advantage of the fact that some
attacks leave traces in several parts of the system within a limited time window. These
traces are normally a consequence of the several steps required to perform an attack or
the persistence of the attacker after failing. The following are high-level descriptions of
some example alarms:
• This alarm is triggered by a rule that looks for the string “Authentication failed”
in a log in real time. The alarm is set with low severity and runs a script.
IF ∃ Event E




Action: Run Script S)
• This alarm is triggered by a rule that checks if a certain field in a log goes over
a threshold in real time. The alarm is set with medium severity and warns the
administrator with a message in the alarm panel.
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IF ∃ Event E
FROM Log L ON Real-time
WHERE Field F > Threshold
THEN Alarm(Severity: Medium,
Action: Show in alarm panel)
• This alarm is triggered by a rule that correlates events from two logs. The rule
looks for situations where the first log does not contain events for the last two hours
and the second log contains at least one event in the last hour. The alarm is set
as highly severe and sends an SMS to system administrators.
IF 6 ∃ Event E1 FROM Log L1 Last 2 Hours
AND ∃ Event E2 FROM Log L2 Last Hour
THEN Alarm(Severity: High,
Action: Send SMS)
The proposed architecture gathers all the evidence of suspicious behavior in the WSNs
of the smart city in a single system. Both detection engines trigger alarms in the case of
theoretical undesirable events. However, a large number of these alarms can be classified
as false alarms, or they are due to unimportant or transient situations. Therefore, the
real challenge is not only to write effective alarms, but also to warn administrators only
when the reliability and the severity of the alarms are high enough. This can be achieved
by creating alarms based on correlation rules, as Figure 3.1 shows. In this figure, 4 in the
data flow schema implies that alarms, which have already been triggered, are used again
in the rule-based detection engine. In this way, alarms affecting the same components,
area, bandwidth, etc., are correlated, triggering a more reliable alarm. In Chapter 6
a framework is defined to assist administrators in creating correlation rules to increase
alarm reliability and to be able to classify security incidents into attack types.
To simplify the definition of rules for an entire smart city, system administrators can use
publicly available signature databases. For instance, Snort1 is a popular IDS that offers
regularly updated signature databases for the most common protocols. Quickdraw2 of-
fers signatures for SCADA. As far as we know, however, there are no signature databases
1"Snort", https://www.snort.org/
2"Quickdraw", http://www.digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/
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specifically designed for WSNs or for smart city applications (e.g. parking, environmen-
tal monitoring). This complicates the management and the detection of anomalies in
contexts with a vast number of incident types.
Moreover, a smart city is a very mutable scenario. Public databases can help admin-
istrators maintaining an updated collection of signatures including recently discovered
vulnerabilities, new components, network configurations, etc. However, it is still an open
problem to find an adequate manner to manage signature databases in large and highly
heterogeneous systems like smart cities. The next section presents the anomaly-based de-
tection engine, which can detect unknown attacks and, therefore, can aid administrators
in discovering that some signatures are missing or out of date.
3.2.3 Anomaly-based detection engine
The rule-based detection engine provides administrators with a handy tool to identify
attacks, looking for the traces that the attacks leave on data. However, this engine
has several limitations, which preclude reliance solely on this intrusion detection mecha-
nism for effective attack detection in the context described in this thesis. The principal
limitations are:
• The rule-based detection engine is especially useful against attacks that are clearly
identifiable through thresholds and which are considered stable in the long term.
However, in a changing environment such as the smart city, static thresholds are
usually hard to define because the environment is dynamic and changes according
to the time of day, the season of the year, the weather conditions, etc.
• Unknown attacks, for which no rules are defined, remain undetected.
• Rules that involve many variables become too complex and are difficult to maintain.
• Finding predefined thresholds for certain variables is sometimes not possible.
• The set of rules defined ad hoc by the administrators requires manual maintenance,
which is costly and does not scale well.
In order to overcome these problems, it is essential to complement the rule-based detec-
tion engine with other mechanisms. For this purpose, the proposed architecture includes
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an anomaly-based detection engine. This engine has the responsibility of computing
thresholds automatically and training complex machine learning models capable of iden-
tifying anomalous data instances due to attacks or failures in the WSNs of the smart
city. As seen in Section 3.2.1, data analyzed with this engine include sensor readings,
network status logs, etc. Henceforth, the fields in a dataset that can be used for the
anomaly analysis are referred as variables.
Section 2.4.1 has shown that, in the literature, there are multiple anomaly detection
techniques capable of performing analysis on data to disclose these types of situation.
Generally, these techniques require a dataset of samples to train models. The models are
subsequently used to predict whether new samples are normal or not. Taking this into
account, the main characteristics of the projected detection engine can be summarized
in the following four points:
1. It uses unsupervised or semi-supervised algorithms.
2. The vast majority of the samples in the training datasets are captured during
normal non-attack situations.
3. Training datasets are sampled including observations from most of the different
states that can occur in the monitored service.
4. Training datasets are large.
Regarding the first point, as seen in Section 2.4.1, supervised machine learning algorithms
require the labeling of each training sample with the class that it belongs to. For these
algorithms, in the intrusion detection context, an additional field should be included in
the samples indicating whether the sample is normal or anomalous or, in the case of
computing a model with one class for each type of anomalous situation, the label should
be more specific and indicate the type of situation (e.g. "jamming attack", "selective
forwarding attack"). In the smart city context, it is very difficult to gather a large amount
of labeled data. Administrators could perform some attack simulations on a testbed or
even against the real WSN infrastructure; however, it is unrealistic to systematically
gather comprehensive datasets, including many samples from all attacks reported in
the literature every time that new models have to be trained. Moreover, attacks that
are as yet undiscovered, or that exploit unknown vulnerabilities, would go unnoticed.
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Accordingly, the anomaly-based detection engine mainly has to use semi-supervised or
unsupervised algorithms.
Regarding the second point, training datasets have to contain a very large proportion of
normal samples, because anomaly detection models are normally computed by finding a
boundary that encloses most of the samples in the training dataset. If a training dataset
contains an excessive proportion of abnormal samples, then it is likely that some of these
samples will be included within the boundaries of normality.
Regarding the third point, training datasets have to contain a comprehensive representa-
tion of samples from the various possible normal states and situations in the monitored
service. Otherwise normal situations not represented in the training dataset can fall
outside the computed normality boundaries.
Finally, with regard to the fourth point, training datasets have to be large for the reasons
noted in the previous two points. Using only a few samples can result in models trained
with too many samples from transient network states or unimportant transitory errors
that do not capture the normal behavior of the system. Furthermore, with small training
datasets, the proportion of variables relative to the number of samples increases and,
therefore, overfitting is more likely to occur [79].
3.3 Designing the anomaly-based detection engine
Taking into account the complexity behind intrusion detection based on disclosing anoma-
lies in the data, this section describes the major considerations to bear in mind when
designing the anomaly-based detection engine.
With the purpose of performing a complete and effective anomaly analysis in a smart
city, it is necessary to deploy at least two types of algorithms:
• Univariate algorithms. With this type of algorithm, administrators can monitor
the behavior of a single numeric variable and detect anomalous values falling outside
its normal range. For example, detecting an anomalous reading of −50°C in a
temperature sensor located in a city with a mild climate.
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• Multivariate algorithms. With this type of algorithm, administrators can point
out anomalies taking into account several variables at the same time, even when
each of the analyzed variables stays within its normal boundaries. For example, a
reading of 0°C in a temperature sensor can be considered normal in the winter, but
it can also be considered as anomalous in the summer if the detection algorithm
also takes into account the season of the year, the readings of other temperature
sensors, etc.
These are simple examples of typical anomaly analysis. However, we must bear in mind
that anomaly analysis in smart cities can be very complex. Anomalies detected by
univariate algorithms studying a single variable can provide valuable information for
disclosing the source of an incident. For instance, it is widely known that abnormal
values in the RSSI can be due to interference [80]. Also, univariate analysis in sensor
readings enables the identification of extreme values coming from integrity attacks or
sensors that are not properly calibrated. However, there are many attacks against WSN
that cannot be directly detected with univariate algorithms, because the attacks have
a reduced impact on just one of the received variables. Using multivariate algorithms
is more adequate for considering the impact on several variables at the same time, but
an alarm triggered by one of these algorithms is generally more difficult to link with
the specific causes of the problem. Therefore, intrusion detection in smart city WSNs
is not a straightforward task, and cannot be fully automatized and treated like a black-
box in which the set of anomaly detection algorithms provided can be used for any
context. Administrators have to select the variables to monitor, draw conclusions in the
case of alarms, create correlation rules to trigger meaningful alarms that deserve the
administrator’s attention, etc.
Another difficulty in deploying a system like this is choosing specific algorithms for the
different analyses. Regarding multivariate analysis, as it will be seen in Chapter 4, smart
city administrators should consider implementing detection based on OC-SVM. This is a
semi-supervised algorithm, which gives good detection results in this context. Chapter 4
provides more information about the application of this algorithm and it compares it
with other multivariate algorithms.
Regarding univariate algorithms, two types of situations have to be covered depending
on the monitored variable:
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• Situations where the distribution of the variable is relatively stable in time. In
this way, thresholds can be computed from large amounts of relevant values and
they can be used to predict anomalies in many samples in the future. In this
type of situation, smart city administrators should consider using Tukey’s method
to define thresholds. Numerous studies in the literature have successfully used
algorithms based on Tukey’s method to find outliers with good results [81, 82, 83].
This statistical method is adequate in this context because it is simple, has a low
level of computational complexity and it does not make assumptions about the
statistical distribution of the variable.
• Situations where new values of the variable show strong correlation with immedi-
ately previous values. In this type of situation, smart city administrators should
consider using autoregressive algorithms, such as ARIMA. Autoregressive algo-
rithms have been widely used to detect outliers in WSN data [60, 65]. These
models require very small training datasets, but they have to be recomputed every
time a new value is received.
All these types of models, to varying degrees, are not perennial and eventually have to
be recomputed to adapt to system changes. The next section provides some indications
on how to carry out model maintenance.
3.3.1 Maintenance of machine learning models
The dynamic behavior of cities needs to be taken into account when it comes to keeping
models up-to-date. Therefore, it is necessary to recompute the models when these cease
to capture the normal behavior of the system.
On the one hand, some types of model are already designed to be transient. For instance,
autoregressive models are recomputed after each new observation. On the other hand,
other types of model are more durable and suitable for less mutable data. In order to
know when these models become out-of-date, it is necessary to compute certain metrics
regularly to assess the performance of each model.
Any set of metrics selected for the purpose of evaluating anomaly detection models has to
take into account four situations: cases where attacks are not detected (false negatives),
Chapter 3. Architecture 49
Table 3.1: Metrics to asses anomaly detection algorithms
True positive rate (TPR)
true positives
true positives+ false negatives
False positive rate (FPR)
false positives
false positives+ true negatives
F-score
true positives
true positives+ (false negatives+ false positives)/2
cases where the algorithms incorrectly point out attacks that have not occurred (false
positives), cases where the attacks are correctly detected (true positives) and cases that
are correctly identified as not being under attack (true negatives). Taking these into
account, the metrics shown in Table 3.1 have been widely used to assess IDSs and machine
learning algorithms [58]. The true positive rate (also known as detection rate, sensitivity,
or recall) measures the percentage of attacks that have been properly detected. The false
positive rate (also known as the false alarm rate) indicates the percentage of normal
samples misclassified as attacks. Finally, the f-score is used as a general overview of
the performance of the algorithm. This metric takes into account the number of true
positives over the arithmetic average of predicted positives and real positives.
Using these metrics, administrators can establish limits, beyond which the models have
to be considered out-of-date and must be recomputed. In order to compute these metrics
and establish the limits, it is important to have labeled test datasets. The predictions
for each sample in a test dataset have to be compared with the labels indicating the
actual class of the sample, resulting in one of the four cases mentioned above: false
negative, false positive, true negative or true positive. The purpose of these labels must
not be confused with the labels required to train models with supervised algorithms,
which require much larger datasets. To compute these metrics, shorter datasets can be
used. The following are examples of methods that can be used to label a small dataset:
• Perform attacks against real smart city WSNs under supervised situations, against
testbeds or in simulators.
• Deploy honeypots to entice attackers to attack the system and monitor their ac-
tivity.
• Use a system to manage alarms in which administrators can mark alarms as false
positives or true positives.
Chapter 3. Architecture 50
Figure 3.2: Pipeline describing the general process to detect intrusions from smart
city WSN data.
As seen in these sections, intrusion analysis involves several steps, such as training models
or predicting anomalies in new observations. The next section presents a pipeline with
the necessary steps and the subprocesses involved in the intrusion analysis with the
proposed architecture.
3.4 Intrusion analysis outline
Figure 3.2 shows a pipeline including the necessary subprocesses to process smart city
WSN data from their arrival at the servers until an alarm can be triggered. First, when
data reach the servers they have to be preprocessed in real time. Afterwards, data can
be filtered and aggregated. Data aggregation can be performed by several criteria. A
usual criterion is according to some previously defined clusters. Preprocessed, filtered,
and aggregated data are used to compute models, which will later be used to detect
anomalies in order to disclose attacks and other failures in an intrusion detection
subprocess. The alarms triggered by the anomaly detection analysis are processed by an
alarm management subprocess in order to correlate them, to reduce the amount of
false positives and to warn administrators only in the case of relevant situations. Below
each of these subprocesses will be briefly described.
3.4.1 Preprocessing
As a first step before performing any type of analysis, it is necessary to conduct some
kind of data transformation in order to ease subsequent operations:
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• Parsing: messages enter the system with multiple formats (e.g. string containing
several variables separated by #). These data need to be parsed and transformed
into at least a semi-structured data type (e.g. JavaScript object notation (JSON))
linked with some metadata to give context to the different fields.
• Indexing: messages enter the system in a disorderly way, but they contain a field
with its creation timestamp. In order to ease some other preprocessing operations
that require previously received messages and also to ease subsequent subprocesses,
messages have to be indexed according to a temporal component. WSN data do
not arrive perfectly in order because:
– Some sensors store several readings in the memory, which are sent jointly after
a certain amount of time has elapsed.
– Providers have several alternatives for sending data from WSN to smart city
central servers (e.g. via municipal telecommunication networks or via private
infrastructure through servers owned by the providers). The different alter-
natives generate different delays between the initial data transmission and its
reception at the final destination.
– Within a single multi-hop WSN, packets can take different routes, which re-
sults in different delays.
– Transmission errors necessitate the resending of packets, which increases mes-
sage delays.
• Simple variable creation: new variables are created applying simple functions
to aggregate or transform one or more fields from the current message (e.g. unit
conversion).
• Complex variable creation: new variables are created applying complex func-
tions to aggregate or transform one or more fields from the current message or from
a previous message (e.g. computing battery consumed since last received message).
3.4.2 Filtering
In this subprocess, data are selected by standard filtering operations, such as comparing
variables with user defined values or with other variables. In this way, administrators can
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extract just the important samples from the plethora of data that arrive to the system.
For example, administrators can set filters to get data only from certain sensors, from a
certain area, etc.
3.4.3 Clustering
The principal purpose of this subprocess is to create certain divisions in data in order
to draw meaningful conclusions after anomaly analysis. The divisions can be created
ad-hoc by system administrators, or using clustering algorithms. The purpose of this
subprocess is twofold. Firstly, using clusters, nodes that can be affected by the same
attacks can be grouped and analyzed together (e.g. neighboring nodes transmitting in
the same frequency band). Secondly, search space gets reduced, which simplifies finding
the root cause of security incidents.
3.4.4 Aggregation
This subprocess is responsible for combining data extracted in the filtering subprocess, in
such a way that data stay grouped according to a certain criterion, such as time intervals,
clusters, etc. Typical data aggregation operations are: the minimum, the maximum, the
sum, the mean, the median, the mode, etc. For instance, summarized information from
an environmental WSN can be periodically obtained by computing the minimum, the
maximum and the mean of the sensor readings.
3.4.5 Model computation
As previously seen, anomaly detection is based on using previously computed models
to predict whether an observation is normal or not. These models can be very simple,
such as thresholds, or complex, such as machine learning models. In both cases, the cost
of computing models is normally not insignificant. Therefore, models must already be
computed prior to their usage in real-time applications.
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3.4.6 Intrusion detection
Intrusion detection is performed on preprocessed, filtered, clustered and/or aggregated
data using either the rule-based detection engine or the anomaly-based detection engine.
As previously seen, the former uses attack signatures to look for traces of attacks, and
the latter uses the models computed beforehand to predict whether new data has to be
considered abnormal.
3.4.7 Alarm management
The intrusion predictions reported in the previous step are used by an alarm management
subprocess to create alarms and warn administrators. This subprocess can use variables
such as WSN criticality or a degree of abnormality extracted from certain anomaly
detection algorithms to sort alarms by importance. Furthermore, administrators can
correlate alarms with the rule-based detection engine in order to concentrate several
alarms into a single and more relevant alarm, to look for faults in various networks at
the same time, etc.
3.5 Use case: attack on a parking WSN
This section shows how the proposed architecture can be applied to a smart city scenario
using a use case based on a public car park. To build this use case, we used Castalia
3.33 to implement typical WSN configurations and to simulate several parking scenarios.
We also implemented popular attacks against these network configurations. In this way,
we used the resulting simulated data in a prototype of an intrusion detection platform
following the architecture described in this chapter. The SIEM Splunk was the core of
the prototype: its indexing tools were used to store the data, its alarm module was used
as the rule-based detection engine, and two new modules to train and test OC-SVM were
developed, within the SIEM Splunk, as the anomaly-based detection engine.
This use case shows the usage of the proposed architecture following the main steps in the
pipeline described in Section 3.4. In this way, this use case provides a proof of concept of
the architecture, it shows the feasibility of implementing and using it to detect attacks in
3"Castalia", http://castalia.npc.nicta.com.au/
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Table 3.2: Summary use case scenarios
Scenario parking
sensors
Other sensors MAC Topology
1 9 2 CO2, 3 light,
1 mass, 2 humidity
802.15.4 Star
2 9 2 CO2, 3 light,
1 mass, 2 humidity
TMAC Star
3 30 2 CO2, 3 light,
1 mass, 2 humidity
802.15.4 Star
4 30 2 CO2, 3 light,
1 mass, 2 humidity
TMAC Star
5 100 None 802.15.4 Star
6 100 None TMAC Star
7 100 None 802.15.4 Tree
typical WSNs, such as the car park, and it shows how data from all the communication
layers can be combined for effective detection of different types of attack in WSNs.
3.5.1 Scenarios
In order to build our scenario, first we studied the dynamics of the data sent by the
sensors of different services in Barcelona and also the information fields included in
the packets by the providers. Additionally, the most common WSN configurations and
protocols were taken into account. As a result, we configured seven different parking
WSNs. Table 3.2 shows a summary of the scenarios. As it can be seen, to capture the
variability of layouts and the diversity of technologies in the smart city, the networks
were designed relying on two types of data link protocol (802.15.4 and TMAC) and
two types of topology (star and tree). The number of parking sensors varies in each
configuration between 9 and 100 sensors. In addition, in scenarios 1 - 4, sensors from
a miscellany of applications (environmental monitoring, light, and mass in a container)
shared a single WSN with different sending behaviors. While parking, light and mass
sensors were reactive, CO2 and humidity sensors were programmed to send readings at
regularly scheduled intervals.
These scenarios were implemented in the WSN simulator, Castalia. As a result of the
simulations, a dataset was generated containing data aggregated in 2-hour intervals. The
resulting dataset included application data (e.g. amount of times that each parking slot
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was used within each time interval) and also variables from the other communication
protocol layers (e.g. number of packets not received due to interference).
3.5.2 Attack model
We used Castalia to simulate various scenarios under normal circumstances. We then
also used this WSN simulator to implement and simulate several attacks against the
networks. In this way, test datasets were generated to evaluate the performance of the
proposed detection algorithms.
In this simulation, we assumed that attackers intend to gain advantage over other users
of the public parking spaces. To this end, attackers try to disrupt communication be-
tween several nodes during high occupancy hours. Thus, parking applications cannot
receive updates when parking slots become free and, therefore, attackers have a higher
probability of finding available slots in certain areas.
In order to disrupt communication, we conducted three different attacks aiming at the
three first layers of the communication stack (i.e. physical, data link and network).
In WSNs, these layers are the most vulnerable ones, specially in smart cities, where
the sensor nodes lay unprotected on public places and, therefore, the nodes and the
communication medium are easily accessible. The conducted attacks are:
• Jamming. This attack at the physical layer consisted of sending a high-power
signal to the gateway in order to corrupt legitimate packets.
• Unfairness. At the data link layer, the attackers exploited the channel access
protocols to prevent transmissions from legitimate nodes. In 802.15.4 configura-
tions, legitimate nodes use clear channel assessment (CCA) to check whether the
channel is free before transmitting. The attackers continuously occupied the com-
munication channel impeding other transmissions. In TMAC configurations, the
attackers corrupted reference control packets used by legitimate nodes to initiate
transmission.
• Selective forwarding and blackhole. In these attacks at the network layer, the
attackers captured a node that stopped retransmitting certain packets from some
nodes (selective forwarding), or from all of them (blackhole).
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3.5.3 Intrusion detection process
The following sections briefly describe how the steps in the pipeline presented in Sec-
tion 3.4 were taken to process the data.
3.5.3.1 Preprocessing, filtering, clustering and aggregation
In this use case, the preprocessing, the filtering, the clustering, and the aggregation
subprocesses were done in an ad hoc and simplified manner. Firstly, it must be taken
into account that the results of a Castalia simulation are variables related to the com-
munication status aggregated during a time interval of 2 hours in this case. Therefore,
preprocessing and aggregation are carried out by the simulator automatically. Secondly,
the simulation was designed including only the relevant nodes from a small area sharing
the 2.4 GHz bandwidth. Therefore, the scenario was already designed creating a single
cluster by area and bandwidth. Filtering was also simple in this case, since for each
computed model, filters consisted of sub-selecting the required variables.
3.5.3.2 Model computation
An anomaly-based detection engine was implemented using OC-SVM from the scikit-
learn 0.15.2[84] library. In order to train models, we implemented a new custom command
in Splunk: svmtrain. A subset of samples from the attack-free dataset was used to train
the models. Figure 3.3a shows the usage of this command to train a model using training
data from Scenario 7. For each of the scenarios we trained an OC-SVM model with a
radial basis function (RBF) kernel, which we stored within the Splunk server.
When available, the selected variables from the training dataset included: the time of
day; the number of state changes (free/occupied) per sensor; the percentage of lost
application packets per sensor; the number of ACK, CTS and RTS packets sent by
the gateway; and the number of packets received with and without interference. These
system status variables were received and recorded in the base station using current
protocols implemented in Castalia. Therefore, these variables can easily be accessed and
sent to the smart city servers without having to redesign and deploy new protocols in
the sensor nodes.
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index=20150325-100nodes802154-multihop sim_type=train
| fields - _* | fields + "hour", *_appsend, *_applossrate
| svmtrain file_name=scenario7 nu=0.01 gamma=0.01
(a) Example of svmtrain command to compute an OC-SVM model. The training dataset corre-
sponds to Scenario 7 in Table 3.2 including variables: hour of the day, number of sent application
packets and loss rate for each node.
index=20150325-100nodes802154-multihop sim_type=test
| fields - _* | fields + "hour", *_appsend, *_applossrate
| svmtest file_name=scenario7
(b) Example of svmtest command to predict if each sample in a test dataset is anomalous. The
test dataset contains samples from Scenario 7 in Table 3.2 including variables: hour of the day,
number of sent application packets and loss rate for each node.
Figure 3.3: Training and test custom command examples
3.5.3.3 Intrusion detection
This section explains how we used the two detection engines to disclose intrusions.
Rule-based detection engine
In this use case, we implemented rules in Splunk’s alarm mechanism to look for traces of
missing received data from the sensors that regularly send their readings. For instance,
Figure 3.4a shows a rule that checks whether the environmental sensor reading data
programmed at 19:00 was properly received. If this reading was not received, then a
medium-severity alarm was triggered.
Anomaly-based detection engine
As previously mentioned, a major problem of a rule-based detection engine is the infea-
sibility of detecting unknown attacks. Therefore, we used the models trained with the
custom command svmtrain to detect attacks that, unlike the examples from the previous
section, do not leave clear or easily identifiable traces in the data.
In order to make predictions with the trained models, we implemented another custom
command: svmtest. The datasets used to test the models included an equal proportion
of instances from the attack-free data that were not used to train the models and in-
stances from the simulation with attacks. Figure 3.3b shows the usage of svmtest. With
this command, we first load the model previously computed with svmtrain, then, for
each sample in the test dataset from Scenario 7, we predict if the sample is normal or
anomalous.
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index="parking_simulation" host=20150113-9sensors802154-2h
| eval count_co2_sent = ’10_appsend’ + ’11_appsend’ + ’12_appsend’ | search count_co2_sent<3
(a) CO2 not received: Medium-severity alarm scheduled at 20:00 to verify that the regular
CO2 readings from 19:00 have been received.
index="parking_simulation" host=20150113-9sensors802154-2h | fields - _*
| fields + "hour", "0_radiopckfailedNoInt",
"0_radiopckfailedInt", "0_radiopckfailedBelowSens", "0_radiopckfailedNonRX",
"0_radiopckreceivedWithInt", "0_radiopckreceivedWithoutInt", *_appsend
| svmtest file_name=20150113-9sensors802154-2h | search test=-1
(b) SVM outlier: Medium-severity alarm to identify outliers in real time using a trained
OC-SVM within a two-hour window.
index=_audit action=alert_fired | eval ttl=expiration-now() | search ttl>0
| eval is_not_co2=if(ss_name=="Scenario 1 - CO2 Not Received",1,0)
| eval is_svm=if(ss_name=="Scenario 1 - SVM outlier",1,0)
| stats sum(is_not_co2) as sum_alert1 sum(is_svm) as sum_alert2
| eval num_alerts=sum_alert1+sum_alert2 | search num_alerts>1
(c) Multiple alerts within an hour: High-severity alarm to detect that several pieces of
evidence are affecting the network within a one-hour window.
Figure 3.4: Examples of rules defining alarms
In this use case, for each of the 7 scenarios, we trained an OC-SVM model and we also im-
plemented a medium-severity alarm triggered when the anomaly-based detection engine
discovers an anomaly using the trained model. Figure 3.4b shows the rule implementing
the alarm for Scenario 1.
3.5.3.4 Alarm management
As seen in the previous section, the rule-based and the anomaly-based detection engines
trigger alerts when certain conditions are met. In order to warn administrators only in
reliable situations, we created correlation rules to join the alerts from the two engines.
In Figure 3.4c, we defined a correlation rule that triggers a high severity alarm when
multiple alarms are triggered within a 1 hour window. Figure 3.5 shows Splunk’s alarm
panel after triggering several alarms using the test dataset from Scenario 1. As the figure
shows, first the anomaly-based detection engine detected an anomalous circumstance in
real time and triggered an alarm. Next, a rule looking for missing data triggered an alarm
when the CO2 readings were not received in their scheduled time. Finally, a correlation
rule that regularly checks if there are several alarms in the last hour triggered a highly
severe alarm.
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Figure 3.5: Alarms in the alarm panel in Splunk
3.5.4 Results and discussion
This section discusses the benefits of the proposed architecture, which combines rule-
based and anomaly-based detection. Firstly, detection results of the anomaly detection
process with OC-SVM will be analyzed. Then, the positive effects of bringing together
the alarms from the two detection engines with correlation rules will be evaluated.
To evaluate the detection results of the anomaly-based detection engine, we calculated
the three standard metrics shown in Table 3.1 on the test dataset containing instances
with and without attacks. As Table 3.3 shows, this evaluation yielded high detection
rates in all the scenarios.
It is worth noticing that all available variables were included in the detection models.
This is important because the impact on the variables is different depending on the
type of attack. For example, the jamming attack has a clear impact on physical layer
variables and the blackhole attack has no impact on them. Implementing feature selection
methods that systematically reduce the number of variables included in the models can
have a negative impact on the detection of certain attacks that are unknown at the time
of designing the feature selection methods. Therefore, this shows that OC-SVM can
be used, including variables from all communication layers and that detection results for
different types of attack, network configuration and communication protocol are generally
good.
However, the false alarm rate in the scenarios with more nodes is slightly high. As it
can be seen in the tree topology, the lack of information about widely separated nodes
at the base station reduces the detection rate when a small percentage of the nodes are
affected by the attacker (i.e. selective forwarding), and it increases the false alarm rate.
In order to reduce the number of false alarms, correlation rules can be implemented
to look for multiple alarms affecting the same area or the same components. Since
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Table 3.3: Detection results of the anomaly-based analysis in the use case
Scenario Attack Detection rate (%) False alarm rate(%) F-score (%)
1 Jamming 98 2 97.51
1 Unfairness 97.5 2 97.26
2 Jamming 98.5 3.33 96.81
2 Unfairness 99 3.33 97.06
3 Jamming 99 3.67 96.82
3 Unfairness 99 3.67 96.82
4 Jamming 100 3.67 97.32
4 Unfairness 99.5 3.67 97.07
5 Jamming 100 4.91 93.14
5 Unfairness 95.56 4.91 90.89
6 Jamming 100 13.43 83.24
6 Unfairness 90.84 13.43 78.61
7 Blackhole 100 14.54 82.29
7 Sel.forward. 82.78 14.54 73.31
WSNs share the radio spectrum and sometimes they even share network devices, signs
of abnormal behavior in various networks in the same area can be caused by a single
attack. In this use case, we correlated the alarms from a rule that was regularly checking
for missing data from the CO2 WSN with the alarms triggered by the anomaly-based
detection engine analyzing the other nodes. An alarm from this correlation rule can be set
as highly severe. Although CO2 sensor nodes sometimes transiently fail to communicate
with the base station, this can be considered normal in WSN and it is not enough
reason to warn administrators; similarly, the anomaly-based detection engine triggers a
certain amount of false alarms. However, the chance of these two circumstances occurring
together, in a short time interval, becomes unlikely.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed an architecture, which provides tools to ease the
complex problem of disclosing intrusions in a large and heterogeneous environment such
as the smart city.
We have seen that traditional security needs to be enhanced in order to detect anoma-
lies in smart city WSNs operated by third parties. The reduced access to the service
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provider network devices limits the visibility of the WSNs to smart city administrators,
and prevents a conventional security analysis. To overcome this, we have proposed a
non-intrusive architecture that combines a rule-based and an anomaly-based detection
engine. This architecture deploys a new security layer in the central servers above the
miscellaneous equipment of the providers. Thus, problems due to the heterogeneity,
limited access, or updating difficulties of certain devices are avoided. The proposed ar-
chitecture is compatible with the already deployed infrastructure, as it does not add
any requirements to the existing infrastructure. Additionally, we described a pipeline
with the necessary subprocesses to process WSN data and disclose intrusions using the
proposed architecture with conventional anomaly detection techniques.
Furthermore, we have implemented a prototype of the architecture on top of Splunk
and we have presented a use case structured around a public car park that shows the
benefits of combining the two types of detection engine. On the one hand, the anomaly-
based detection engine (implemented with OC-SVM) is capable of detecting unknown
attacks and its unsupervised learning nature provides it with flexibility in a changing
environment like the smart city. In the use case presented in this chapter, OC-SVM
included variables from several communication layers and showed good detection results
for various attacks aimed at different vulnerabilities affecting the most important layers.
Nevertheless, in some situations, anomaly-based detection triggers excessive false alarms.
On the other hand, the rule-based detection engine does not have as much flexibility
as the anomaly-based detection engine, but it triggers highly reliable alarms. In the
use case, we implemented several rules verifying the correct arrival of WSN data with a
regular behavior. Additionally, we created correlation rules joining the alarms generated
by both detection engines. This increased the reliability of the anomaly-based alarms
and allowed system administrators to be warned in the case of more important situations.
We have seen that intrusion detection in the smart city is a very complex problem. A
black-box solution with a multipurpose detection algorithm that covers most of the at-
tacks for most of the configurations is not feasible. To tackle intrusion detection in this
context, it is first necessary to select the most adequate algorithms. In this chapter,
we have indicated some suitable algorithms for implementing anomaly analysis in the
context of the smart city. With these indications, this thesis contributes to simplifying
the system administrator’s task at the time of setting up the anomaly-based detection
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engine. Chapter 4 extends the study of some of these algorithms by comparing several
multivariate anomaly detection techniques. Secondly, it is necessary to select the vari-
ables that will be used with each algorithm and that will trigger the first alarms pointing
to possible security problems. Thirdly, it is necessary to create correlation rules in order
to group alarms to identify those that are meaningful and therefore require the attention
of system administrators. Chapter 6 provides more details about correlation rules.
Chapter 4
A comparative study of anomaly
detection techniques
One of the most important components of the architecture proposed in the previous
chapters is the anomaly-based detection engine. Section 3.3 has shown that this engine
can be implemented using several types of algorithms, being multivariate anomaly de-
tection an essential technique to disclose intrusions by taking into account the behavior
of several variables at the same time. Although there are many studies analyzing the
behavior of multivariate techniques in other contexts, as far as we know, there is no
study analyzing these techniques with WSN data in a smart city scenario from the point
of view of smart city administrators.
Hence, the study presented in this chapter has the main goal of comparing four semi-
supervised multivariate anomaly detection techniques under the point of view of smart
city administrators. This study evaluates the techniques taking into account scenarios
with different available network status variables. It is also a main objective of this study
to find the minimum amount of network status variables that providers have to send
to the smart city data centers in order to be capable to perform a proper centralized
anomaly detection analysis.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the techniques
used in this comparative study. Section 4.2 explains the simulation and the experimental
procedure. Section 4.3 contains the results of the study. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes
the chapter.
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4.1 Description of anomaly detection techniques
This section describes the anomaly detection techniques that will be used in this com-
parative study. The compared techniques are the most frequently used methods in the
literature for this purpose, and they are based on Mahalanobis distance, local outlier
factor, hierarchical clustering and OC-SVM.
In the smart city context, it is not possible to assume that data from all the possible
attack categories are available to create comprehensive training datasets (e.g. some
attacks are unknown until new vulnerabilities are disclosed). Accordingly, supervised
techniques are not suitable in this context. Regarding semi-supervised and unsupervised
techniques, it is also necessary not to base the attack detection on the previous knowledge
of the problem. For instance, some statistical techniques assume specific distributions
of the data. However, this is unknown in many smart city services and sometimes data
behavior is variable depending on the time of day, the season of the year, the weather
conditions, etc.
Apart from the aforementioned techniques, we have considered other more recent meth-
ods from the area of machine learning. For example, algorithms based on random
forests [85] have been used successfully in many scenarios of different domains, but their
current popularity has not reached the levels of support vector machines. Another family
of algorithms that is certainly worth considering is deep learning. In this regard, recent
advances show that this is a very promising field. As an example, algorithms based
on deep belief networks [86] convolutional neural networks [87] or recursive neural net-
works [88] have been used successfully in several scenarios to improve the performance
obtained with previous techniques. In the area of anomaly detection, additionally, the
authors of [89] have used deep learning in combination with other techniques to identify
outliers, and they have obtained promising detection results.
However, the use of deep learning for anomaly detection is a research field still in its
infancy. Deep learning techniques, in general, require costly training processes, which
is something easily attainable in fields such as computer vision, speech recognition, etc.
However, in the case of smart city WSNs, obtaining large training datasets is much
more complex due to their dynamic nature. This dynamic behavior involves frequently
retraining the models generated by the machine learning algorithms, thus making it
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difficult to work with huge training datasets and apply the deep learning techniques
successfully. Therefore, for these reasons, the study of deep learning techniques in this
scenario is beyond the scope of this thesis.
4.1.1 Mahalanobis distance
Mahalanobis distance measures the number of standard deviations that an observation
is from the mean of a distribution. This measure can be used to detect outliers in
multivariate data, because outlier observations do not have normal values in one or more
dimensions. [90] surveys outlier detection methodologies and compares Mahalanobis
distances with other proximity-based outlier detection techniques.
4.1.2 Local outlier factor
Local outlier factor (LOF) is a degree measuring the isolation of a point in a vector
space with respect to its neighbors [57]. In order to compute this degree of isolation,
LOF is based on the concepts of reachability distance and local reachability density (lrd).
The reachability distance (Equation 4.1) between two points p and o is the maximum
value between the distance between p and o and the farthest distance between o and
its k nearest neighbors (k-distance). The lrd for point p is the inverse of the average
reachability distance between p and itsMinPts neighbors, whereMinPts is a parameter
of the algorithm. Equation 4.2 shows the lrd formula, where NMinPts(p) is the k −
distance neighborhood of p with k = MinPts, which is a set including the points that
have a distance to p equal or lower than k − distance. Finally, the LOF (Equation 4.3)
computes the average ratio of the lrd of p with the lrd of its k neighbors. LOF values
smaller than 1 indicate high densities, LOF values greater than 1 indicate low densities
and LOF values close to 1 indicate average density spaces. Outliers are considered to be
in low density regions.
reach_distk(p, o) = max{k_distance(o), distance(p, o)} (4.1)












In [57], the authors of LOF suggest a lower and an upper bound for the k value. The
lower bound for k can be considered as the minimum amount of nearby points that can
mark out a more isolated nearby point as an outlier. It is considered good practice to
select a k higher than 10 to remove unwanted statistical fluctuations. Conversely, the
upper bound for k indicates the maximum number of nearby points that can potentially
be considered outliers. A group of k− 1 or less nearby points require other points in the
vector space to have k points to compute the LOF. This implies that the LOF values
for the points in the group increases and becomes similar to the LOF of the isolated
points. Therefore, either some isolated points are considered normal or the points in the
group are considered outliers. In their experiments, the authors of LOF indicate that
the algorithm performs well selecting values of k between 10 and 20.
4.1.3 Hierarchical clustering
Hierarchical clustering is a type of analysis that aims to partition a dataset in groups of
data (i.e. clusters) according to a similarity measure and creating a tree-based structure
that eases the anomaly analysis. This clustering analysis is performed using two types
of approaches: top-down or bottom-up [91]. In this thesis we focus on agglomerative
hierarchical clustering, which is a bottom-up approach, where initially each sample of
the dataset falls in a different cluster and, in each step of the algorithm, two clusters are
selected according to a similarity measure and combined in a new cluster. This process
ends when there is only one cluster that includes all the samples. A common similarity
measure can be computed using the Euclidean distance in Ward’s method [92]. With
this method, two clusters with the minimum average distance from any sample in one
cluster to any sample in the other cluster are merged in each step.
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(a) ν = 0.01 , γ = 0.2 (b) ν = 0.01, γ = 0.8 (c) ν = 0.01, γ = 2
Figure 4.1: RBF kernel OC-SVM trained with different parameters. In a, the influ-
ence area of the support vectors is wide, so many outliers are incorrectly classified as
normal. In b, the frontier is very near the support vectors, so there is a reduced number
of misclassified outliers and all the normal test samples are properly classified. In c,
the model is overfitting the training data, so many normal test samples are classified
as outliers.
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering can be used to compute outlier ranking factors for
the samples in the dataset. Outliers are theoretically more dissimilar to other observa-
tions and they should be more resistant to be merged in a new cluster. Thereby, various
methods have been proposed to obtain the outlier factors with this type of clustering,
such as linear, sigmoid or sizeDiff [93].
4.1.4 Support vector machines
Classification techniques based on support vector machines (SVM) have proven to be
effective in several contexts related to intrusion detection [94, 95]. Basically, classification
techniques based on machine learning require two steps. First, a dataset is used to train
a learning model. Then, the trained model is used to classify new data samples. Several
features define each sample of the datasets. The SVM classification process represents
the training dataset in a n-dimensional vector space, n being the number of features of
the training data. Then, it defines a hyperplane (i.e. a n − 1 dimensional plane) that
separates (with a maximum margin) the samples from the different classes. The support
vectors are the subset of training samples that are near the hyperplane and that define
it. Finally, the hyperplane acts as a frontier to classify other samples.
In this thesis, we use OC-SVM, which are a special case of semi-supervised SVM that
do not require attack labeled data. OC-SVM build a frontier to classify new samples
as normal or outlier. In SVM, different types of kernel functions are available to build
the most adequate hyperplane for each application. In this work, we use a RBF kernel,
which can learn complex regions [52]. In order to build the frontier, RBF kernel OC-SVM
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use basically two parameters[84]. On the one hand, ν defines the maximum fraction of
outliers present in the training data. On the other hand, γ establishes the influence area
of the support vectors on the classification. Figure 4.1 exemplifies the impact on the
learned frontier that γ has for a fixed value of ν. As shown in Figure 4.1b, increasing
the value of γ implies adjusting the frontier closer to the training samples. This reduces
the number of misclassified outliers as normal samples. However, Figure 4.1c shows that
increasing γ too much causes the training data to be overfitted. A usual approach to
select optimum parameters is grid search [96]. This method uses a grid with parameter
values that is exhaustively explored in order to select the values that give the best
performance of the SVM over a set of samples.
4.2 Simulation and anomaly detection analysis
This section contains the core steps of this comparative study. First, the challenges of
gathering the necessary data to perform security studies in smart cities are reviewed.
Section 4.2.1 discusses the main challenges and, Section 4.2.2 explains how we overcome
them in this study, besides providing a brief description of the entire procedure taken to
evaluate the different anomaly detection techniques. The other sections contain infor-
mation about the different steps in the analysis: the data collection (Section 4.2.3), the
simulation (Section 4.2.4), the feature selection (Section 4.2.5) and the anomaly analysis
(Section 4.2.6).
4.2.1 Smart city security simulation challenges
As previously seen, smart cities can be considered to be very heterogeneous scenarios,
where many technologies, applications and different suppliers coexist. Thus, the imple-
mentation of software simulators that realistically reflect the complexity of smart city
WSNs is very complicated. In recent years, simulators have been used to test new pro-
tocols and to assess the security techniques that protect simple WSNs in very specific
contexts [97, 98]. OMNET++ [99], Castalia [100], Cooja [101] and NS-2 [102] are among
the most popular WSN simulators.
From a technological perspective, replicatingWSN configurations from different providers
to simulate several smart city scenarios is a very arduous task. This is motivated by the
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extensive variety of existing hardware on the market and the wide availability of commu-
nication protocols for WSNs. Furthermore, although some of the previously mentioned
simulators implement realistic signal propagation algorithms, none does so with a model
that can take into account complex urban components, such as walls, traffic, etc. More-
over, simulators also lack realistic event generation engines to reproduce the dynamics
of the citizens and the other elements interacting with the urban WSN. For example,
Castalia offers multiple distribution functions to simulate the events sensed by the sen-
sors. Nonetheless, selecting the appropriate distribution and modeling the appropriate
behavior for the different applications is complex and can lead to unrealistic conclusions.
Recently, the authors of CupCarbon [103] proposed a simulator for an easy integration
of WSNs and elements of the IoT in smart cities. However, this simulator, which is in-
tended as a supplement to other simulators, is still immature and it does not implement
all the layers of the communication stack.
Performing simulations to test security components poses additional difficulties. On the
one hand, reproducing computer attacks requires a high technological expertise and a
high level of investment in manpower. On the other hand, many attacks exploit unknown
vulnerabilities and, therefore, they are not a priory replicable in controlled simulated
environments.
Moreover, the testing of security issues in controlled contexts using real hardware is
complicated in a smart city. For example, many WSN applications in the cities cannot
be easily deployed at a similar scale in a realistic testbed because they would require an
infrastructure as big and dynamic as a city. In addition, attack tests in operational WSN
are generally incompatible with some application requirements (e.g. 24/7 availability)
and can be detrimental to third parties (e.g. jamming attacks to ZigBee can also provoke
interferences to Wi-Fi users).
Therefore, it is necessary to combine the large amount of data that is already gathered
by smart city providers on the streets with the use of existing simulators to evaluate
the consequences of computer attacks and to determine the most appropriate intrusion
detection techniques and the appropriate security procedures to resolve these issues.
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4.2.2 Experimental procedure
In order to overcome the barriers discussed in the previous section, we use real data from
deployed services in Barcelona to feed a WSN simulator that will generate data following
realistic patterns. Running experiments in the simulator provides the flexibility necessary
to test different communication protocols and network configurations, and it is also a
safe way to execute computer attacks. This section presents how we use this mechanism
to collect a smart city WSN dataset with and without attacks, and how we compare four
anomaly detection techniques to detect intrusions based on Mahalanobis distance, local
outlier factor, hierarchical clustering and OC-SVM. We also compare the performance of
these techniques under different amounts of available network status information, taking
into account three different levels of permitted false positive rates.
The pipeline in Figure 4.2 shows a general picture of the complete process of the analysis.
This process consists of the following steps:
1. Data collection: raw sound data are gathered over a period of 14 days from the
streets of Barcelona (Section 4.2.3).
2. Simulation (Section 4.2.4):
(a) Raw data are used in a simulator to generate WSN data with comprehensive
information about all the communication layers. The simulation is executed
multiple times (one time without including any attack and one time for each
of the attacks), resulting in a dataset containing samples with and without
attacks.
(b) The simulation data are aggregated in time intervals.
3. Feature selection: the features of the dataset are filtered according to those available
at the simulated WSN (Section 4.2.5). As previously stated, the main goal of this
comparative study includes minimizing the amount of network status information
required to detect anomalies. Thus, the features are selected taking into account
the simulated availability of network status information.
4. Anomaly analysis (Section 4.2.6). One of the available detection techniques is
selected and we proceed with the following sub-steps:
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Figure 4.2: Pipeline of the simulation and the experimental process.
(a) Training phase: a model is trained or the parameters required by the detection
technique are setup.
(b) Validation/Test phase: the performance of the technique to distinguish be-
tween the samples that were generated with and without attacks is tested. At
this stage, the metrics to compare the different techniques are computed.
We repeat steps three and four with three different feature sets for each of the four
detection techniques compared in this study. The results taking into account the different
situations are discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.3 Data collection
The first step in this study is the collection of real urban data. The scenario for this
simulation is based on data gathered during 14 days from sound meters deployed in the
city of Barcelona. The sound meters, which are installed on the streets by a service
provider, send their readings to the smart city central servers. The layout of the sensor
nodes is represented in Figure 4.3. The outcome of this first step is a dataset with raw
sound data.
As Figure 4.3 shows, the WSN contains a reduced number of sensors belonging to a
single provider, even though networks gathering data from a city service can be much
more complex, involving many more nodes and several providers. In case of anomalies,
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Figure 4.3: Schema and topology of the simulated WSN. The layout of the sensor
nodes (i.e. nodes 1-10) reproduces the layout of real sound meters deployed in Barcelona
over a 140m x 140m terrain. The topology and the base station (i.e. node 0) location
are setup ad-hoc for the simulation.
however, the network should be divided into smaller sections, because this allows admin-
istrators to reduce the search for the specific compromised equipment to a smaller area
with fewer nodes and less providers.
4.2.4 Simulation
The raw data from the sound readings obtained in the previous step are used in the
second step to build a realistic simulated scenario of a smart city service with Castalia
3.3 simulator [100]. Castalia is an appropriate simulator for these experiments because it
has a highly accurate radio physical model [104], it is specialized in WSNs and, therefore,
it includes the most popular MAC and routing protocols for this type of networks, it
is widely used and it offers a moderate complexity. This simulator can aggregate infor-
mation from all the layers involved in the communication between the sensors and the
base station using different configurations in a WSN. In the studied real WSN imple-
mentations, most of this network status information is currently not disclosed by service
providers and, therefore, it is unavailable at the smart city data centers. Thus, this study
analyzes the effects of including this information to detect attacks.
In order to use the real sound readings in the simulations, we implemented an application
module [105] in Castalia that replays the exact sending behavior of the real sound devices.
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In this way, the simulated sensors acquire the same sending patterns as the real sensors
deployed on the streets.
The simulation also takes into account that WSNs are unreliable networks in which
packets can be lost even in non-attack circumstances. To mimic this behavior, Castalia’s
physical and communication layers lose some packets. This circumstance is paramount in
order to evaluate the detection techniques in a realistic scenario, where communications
are not always perfect. Moreover, we also include two nodes from which no messages are
received because of failed communication and inactivity. The simulated WSN uses the
CC2420 [106] communication module, configured in TMAC [107] and follows a multihop
tree topology, as it can be seen in Figure 4.3.
In step 2, the simulation runs to generate data with and without attacks. The imple-
mented attacks exemplify two easy ways to attack WSNs, which can also be disruptive
for third-party WSNs in smart cities. Moreover, the attacks cover different levels of af-
fectation in terms of the number of compromised nodes in the network and in terms of
disrupted packets. The following are the implemented attacks:
• Constant jamming. Attack at the physical and link layers, where the attackers
send a high power signal to a legitimate node in order to avoid the correct reception
of legitimate packets from other nodes. Besides disrupting application packets, this
attack also has an effect on MAC protocols, because the attacker also jams control
packets and occupies the channel for a long time, which disrupts the coordination
among nodes and impedes other nodes from starting their transmission. We im-
plemented this attack in three situations: near node 4 (affecting 4 nodes in the
lower area of the network), near node 9 (affecting 3 nodes in the higher area of the
network) and near the base station (affecting all the nodes in the network).
• Selective forwarding. Attack at the network layer, where the attackers have
captured the base station and they drop a percentage of random packets before
re-transmitting them to the smart city control center. We implemented this attack
in four levels: a selective forwarding dropping 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% of the
packets.
Besides simulating the WSN events in step 2, Castalia aggregates the outcome in time
intervals. This outcome is mainly a set of variables containing network status information
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about the communication protocol for each node. For instance, the number of radio
packets received with interferences during a certain period of time.
The size of the time window is a paramount parameter in the detection process of attacks
concerning data availability. On the one hand, short attacks can get obscured among
a plethora of data in large time windows. On the other hand, datasets in small time
windows sometimes do not contain enough variability to be able to distinguish between
normal and attack situations.
Having a too large or too small time window also depends on the type of monitored ser-
vice. For instance, during the 14 days of the sound data gathering process, we measured
in Barcelona an average of 30.85 messages per hour, per sensor from a parking service
and 1,000.57 messages per hour, per sensor from an electrical meter service. This implies
that an attack against the electrical meters lasting a few minutes drops several messages
and becomes easily visible, whereas the same attack against the parking sensors does not
always leave traces in the data since a lack of messages from the parking sensors can be
normal for several minutes. In the simulation for this study, we divide the 14-day sound
data in 30-minute time windows. As a result, the dataset contains 5,344 samples of eight
classes (i.e. one class for the 668 samples with no attack and one class for each of the
seven attacks). Each sample contains information like the number of received application
packets and the battery used during the interval.
4.2.5 Feature selection
As previously stated, the main goal of this study is to evaluate the performance of
several semi-supervised and unsupervised techniques in different situations considering
different degrees of network status information availability. To achieve this goal, this
status information is converted into features in a vector space, which is then explored by
the anomaly detection algorithms to identify the attacks. The feature vectors extracted
from the WSN data determine the set of variables included in the learning models of
these algorithms. These variables are the basic knowledge with which to decide if each
sample in the dataset contains anomalies.
In other machine learning applications, a large number of features are gathered and a
feature extraction transformation is executed prior to classification in order to reduce the
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dimensionality of the vector space. However, in our context, the necessary features have
to be chosen from the inception of the process. This is due to the fact that adding extra
features requires computing, sending and forwarding more information from the WSN
nodes, therefore having a negative impact on the network performance and the sensors
battery life. Therefore, this study compares the performance of the detection algorithms,
taking into account three different situations related with the available features:
• Feature Vector 1 (FV1). This includes data aggregated from the minimum
information that any WSN always sends (i.e. the sensor readings and the times-
tamp). The aggregated features are: the number of application packets received at
the central server and the hour of the day.
• Feature Vector 2 (FV2). This includes FV1 fields plus the data extracted and
aggregated from supplementary fields included in the packets (i.e. the sequence
number of the application packet and the battery level). The aggregated features
are: the ones in FV1 and also the number of lost application packets and the
consumed energy.
• Feature Vector 3 (FV3). This includes FV2 fields plus data aggregated from the
principal components of the WSN communication protocol in the physical, link,
network and application layers. The additional features included in this feature
vector per node are: the number of proper radio transmissions with and without
interferences; the number of failed radio transmissions due to interference, the low
sensitivity and incorrect reception state; the number of received MAC ACK and
CTS.
The necessary information to build FV1 and FV2 is already available in some real WSN
implementations in Barcelona, whereas the extra information required to aggregate the
data to build FV3 is currently not available in any implementation. In fact, with FV3, we
are evaluating the case where administrators use all the available features to train and test
the models. Even though not all the features are necessarily relevant to disclose attacks,
we are testing the resistance of the algorithms to increasing the vector dimensionality
with non-relevant features.
The outcome of the feature selection step is the dataset from the previous step filtered
according to one of the feature vector descriptions.
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4.2.6 Anomaly analysis
The anomaly analysis [105] step compares four different techniques using the program-
ming language R [108]. The first technique is implemented with the stats [108] package
and it is based on Mahalanobis distance (See Section 4.1.1 for more information). The
second technique computes the LOF score with DMwR [93] (See Section 4.1.2 for more
information). For the third technique, we compute an outlier score using agglomer-
ative hierarchical clustering analysis according to Ward’s clustering method [92] (See
Section 4.1.3 for more information). This score is obtained with the sizeDiff method
through the function outliers.ranking in stats. Finally, we use the e1071 [109] package
for the fourth technique: a one-class classification with OC-SVM (See Section 4.1.4 for
more information).
The anomaly analysis comprises three basic sub-steps for each of the compared tech-
niques: the training, the validation and the test phases. In order to perform these
sub-steps, first of all, our study takes the filtered dataset obtained in the feature selec-
tion step and divides it as shown in Figure 4.4. As this figure shows, the attack samples
are not included in training dataset (a), because the detection techniques used in this
comparative study are semi-supervised or unsupervised. Regarding the validation and
test datasets, each of them is divided into 8 additional datasets ((b) to (i) in the figure),
resulting in a total of 17 datasets (16 + 1 training dataset). As will be described in the
next section, these datasets are used to run 72 experiments to evaluate the four anomaly
detection techniques described in Section 4.1.
Once these dataset partitions are obtained, basically, we will use the training dataset
to tune the parameters required by the algorithms. We will use the validation dataset
internally during the development of the experiments to estimate the performance of the
algorithms. Finally, we will use the test dataset just once to obtain the final results of this
study. The following sections include more details about these datasets and the actions
taken in the training (Section 4.2.6.1), validation and test phases (Section 4.2.6.2).
4.2.6.1 Training phase
The main responsibility of the training phase is to find the best parameters for the
algorithms and to fit the models. We use the training dataset, which contains only
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Figure 4.4: Size of the dataset partitions. The validation and test (val/test) datasets
are partitioned in the same manner and contain the same number of samples of each
attack type.
samples without attacks, to perform these two tasks.
Before training the models and selecting the parameters, we first normalize and stan-
dardize the features in all the datasets (i.e. subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation for each feature) and then we identify the features that have a zero
variance in the training dataset. These features are removed from the three datasets (i.e.
training, validation and test). Thereby, the features that do not provide any information
for the detection process are eliminated. We use the remaining features in the training
dataset to train the models and to find the best parameters for the algorithms consid-
ering three different levels of false positive rate: permissive (false positive rate < 15%),
restrictive (false positive rate < 10%) and very restrictive (false positive rate < 5%).
From now on, we will refer to these levels as the permitted false positive rate (PFPR).
We consider that a rate of more than 15% overwhelms administrators with an excessive
number of false alarms.
In order to select the optimum parameters for the OC-SVM, we use grid search [96]. In
this method, a grid with parameter values is exhaustively explored in order to select the
values that give the best performance using the training dataset. OC-SVM requires the
set up of two parameters: ν and γ. We fix the value of ν to the PFPR, since the training
dataset does not contain any samples with attacks and the ν value is a higher limit
on the fraction of outliers in the training dataset [110]. We use grid search to find the
best value for γ using svm.tune [109], configured in a 10-fold cross-validation repeated
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3 times [111]. This function uses the classification error as a performance measure to
decide the best value for γ.
Before the different detection techniques can be compared, an additional step has to be
carried out, since the OC-SVM technique returns a binary value (which simply indicates
if the sample is an outlier or not) and the LOF, Mahalanobis and hierarchical clustering
techniques return an outlier score (in our context, outliers will be considered as attacks).
Thus, the outlier score must be translated into a decision about whether the sample is
considered an outlier or not. In order to do so, for each of these score-based techniques, we
select a threshold score beyond which the sample is considered an outlier. This threshold
score is determined as the threshold where the false positive rate in the training dataset
is equal to the PFPR. The procedure is as follows:
1. The outlier score is computed for each sample in the training dataset using the
corresponding detection algorithm. This results in a list L of scores.
2. Any sample in the training dataset identified as attacked should be considered a
false positive (FP), since this dataset does not contain any attack. Therefore, the
maximum amount of allowed false positives in the training dataset is defined by
the PFPR (i.e. FP ≤ |L| ∗ PFPR).
3. The |L| ∗ PFPR highest score in L is set as the threshold.
Furthermore, LOF also requires the definition of the parameter k. In this study, we have
determined that k = 10 is a good choice following the indications of [57], as described in
Section 4.1.2.
4.2.6.2 Validation and test phase
The validation and test datasets are used to evaluate the performance of the algorithms
in 72 experiments: (1 with all the attacks together + 7 with each attack separately) x 3
feature vector definitions x 3 PFPR levels. As Figure 4.4 shows, these datasets contain
the same number of samples and each is divided into several partitions. Dataset (b)
contains half of the dataset without attacks and the other half with attacks, with equal
proportion of samples from each of the seven attack types. This dataset allows us to
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(a) FV1. (b) FV2. (c) FV3.
Figure 4.5: Results using the test dataset with samples of all the attacks filtering the
features according to the three feature vector definitions with a very restrictive PFPR.
The plots show the metrics f-score (f), the false positive rate (FPR) and the true positive
rate (TPR). The captions below each plot indicate the feature vector definition used in
each case.
validate and test the behavior of the detection algorithms in a general way, taking into
account all the attacks. Moreover, we also create validation and test datasets (c) to (i),
which only include samples of a single attack. These datasets allow us to evaluate the
performance of the algorithms for each of the different attacks separately. We balance
the number of samples with and without attack in each of the datasets using sampling
with replacement [112].
In the validation and test phases, we use the detection algorithms to decide whether
each sample has to be considered as an attack or not. Then, we count the correct
identifications of attacks as true positives, the incorrect identifications of attacks as false
positives, the correct identifications of no attacks as true negatives and the incorrect
identifications of no attacks as false negatives. Afterwards, we compute the metrics
described in Section 3.3.1. The training and validation phases are iteratively conducted
to explore the most suitable configurations of the algorithms. These configurations are
then applied in the test phase to obtain the results shown in the next section. To compare
the different algorithms we use the true positive rate (TPR), the false positive rate (FPR)
and the f-score.
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Table 4.1: Results sorted by TPR using test dataset (b) with samples of all the
attacks.
FV PFPR technique F-score FPR TPR
FV3 very restrictive ocsvm 0.872 0.033 0.798
FV3 restrictive ocsvm 0.857 0.033 0.774
FV2 very restrictive ocsvm 0.853 0.024 0.762
FV2 restrictive ocsvm 0.853 0.024 0.762
FV3 permissive ocsvm 0.843 0.030 0.750
FV1 very restrictive ocsvm 0.6 0.708 0.729
FV1 restrictive ocsvm 0.599 0.696 0.723
FV2 permissive ocsvm 0.809 0.024 0.696
FV1 permissive ocsvm 0.583 0.681 0.690
FV2 permissive hierarchical clustering 0.665 0.211 0.552
FV2 permissive mahalanobis 0.670 0.149 0.542
FV2 restrictive mahalanobis 0.655 0.098 0.511
FV2 permissive lofactor 0.641 0.149 0.507
FV3 permissive hierarchical clustering 0.616 0.220 0.495
FV2 very restrictive mahalanobis 0.645 0.048 0.487
FV3 permissive mahalanobis 0.621 0.149 0.484
FV2 restrictive lofactor 0.631 0.098 0.484
FV3 restrictive mahalanobis 0.598 0.098 0.448
FV2 very restrictive lofactor 0.601 0.048 0.44
FV3 permissive lofactor 0.569 0.149 0.428
FV3 restrictive hierarchical clustering 0.545 0.140 0.401
FV3 restrictive lofactor 0.547 0.098 0.395
FV3 very restrictive mahalanobis 0.535 0.048 0.374
FV2 restrictive hierarchical clustering 0.517 0.098 0.366
FV3 very restrictive lofactor 0.514 0.048 0.354
FV1 permissive hierarchical clustering 0.394 0.158 0.265
FV3 very restrictive hierarchical clustering 0.340 0.054 0.210
FV2 very restrictive hierarchical clustering 0.311 0.071 0.191
FV1 restrictive hierarchical clustering 0.258 0.101 0.156
FV1 permissive lofactor 0.251 0.149 0.154
FV1 restrictive lofactor 0.195 0.098 0.113
FV1 permissive mahalanobis 0.124 0.149 0.071
FV1 very restrictive hierarchical clustering 0.122 0.057 0.067
FV1 very restrictive lofactor 0.117 0.048 0.064
FV1 restrictive mahalanobis 0.112 0.098 0.062
FV1 very restrictive mahalanobis 0.046 0.048 0.024
4.3 Results and discussion
This section shows the most relevant results of the 72 experiments. As previously men-
tioned, these experiments evaluate the detection algorithms using the different feature
vector definitions for the different PFPR on the test dataset partitions shown in Fig-
ure 4.4. Only the most important information is included in this section (Figure 4.5,
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Table 4.2: Results of several cases exceeding the PFPR. Cases where PFPR<FPR
are highlighted







































































Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The remaining results are shown in Appendix A.
Filtering the datasets according to the feature vector definition FV2 and using OC-SVM
is the optimal approach for attack detection in the context described in this chapter.
Table 4.1 (sorted by the true positive rate column) presents the performance of the
algorithms using samples with all the attack types in test dataset (b) and filtering the
features according the three feature vector definitions. The top rows in the table show
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that OC-SVM is the technique performing the best in terms of true positive rate and
false positive rate. For all the PFPR, OC-SVM performs better than any of the other
techniques. The minimum difference in the performance occurs with a permissive PFPR.
In this case the true positive rate using OC-SVM is 37% higher than with LOF, 28%
higher than with Mahalanobis distance and 26% higher than with hierarchical clustering.
With a very restrictive PFPR (Figure 4.5), which is the most challenging configuration
to disclose attacks, the difference in the performance is the highest. In this case the
true positive rate using OC-SVM is 73% higher than with LOF, 56% higher than with
Mahalanobis distance and 300% higher than with hierarchical clustering. In this last
configuration, the true positive rate using OC-SVM is over 75% and the f-score over
85%.
From a theoretical point of view, the results suggest that a large amount of samples
with attack lie too close to samples without attack in the vector space. Therefore,
techniques based on distances (i.e. Mahalanobis, LOF and hierarchical clustering) cannot
distinguish between the two types of samples in many cases (especially in the most
restrictive situations). However, in OC-SVM, the results suggest that the separating
hyperplane resulting from the training process is closely adjusted to the data without
attacks. As a result, samples with attacks lie, in most cases, outside the frontier defined
by this hyperplane, even when these samples are very near to the ones without attacks.
Furthermore, as it can be seen in Appendix A, using the features defined by FV2, OC-
SVM also gives the best results for all the metrics in 18 of the 21 experiments when
using test datasets (c) to (i), which contain only samples of a single type of attack (i.e.
7 attacks × 3 feature vector definitions). However, in three experiments (Table 4.2), the
false positive rate exceeds the PFPR. In the experiment with 30% selective forwarding,
the false positive rate exceeds the very restrictive PFPR by 6.7 percentage points and
the restrictive PFPR by 1.7 percentage points. In the experiment with 50% selective
forwarding, the false positive rate exceeds the very restrictive PFPR by less than 1
percentage point. Although these three experiments show the false positive rate as
slightly over the PFPR, the other 18 experiments show that OC-SVM is generally the
most suitable in this context.
Unlike filtering features with FV2 or FV3, when filtering is performed with FV1, datasets
with and without attacks show only a slight variation. For example, as Table 4.3 shows,
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Table 4.3: Mean of the standard deviation of all the features of the training dataset
(a) and the test dataset (b) with all the attacks for each feature vector definition
FV Dataset Std. Mean
FV1 training dataset (a) 0.48
FV1 test dataset (b) 0.45
FV2 training dataset (a) 0.39
FV2 test dataset (b) 0.60
FV3 training dataset (a) 0.57
FV3 test dataset (b) 0.79
when data in the feature vectors are normalized and we compute the mean of the stan-
dard deviation among all the features, with FV1 the difference between including and
excluding attacks is minimal (i.e. 0.48 for the training dataset and 0.45 for the test
dataset). However, this difference is larger with the other two feature vector definitions
(i.e. 0.39 for the training dataset and 0.60 for the test dataset with FV2). Including
only features from FV1 makes attack samples and normal samples to lie very close in
the vector space. Therefore, the performance of all the compared techniques is generally
very poor in this case as it can be seen in Table 4.1. With FV1, the highest true positive
rate is achieved when dealing with attacks that affect a large number of nodes (i.e. 90%
selective forwarding attack and jamming attack near the base station). In this case,
the technique based on hierarchical clustering achieves a true positive rate of around
30% if PFPR is permissive. Hence, in the scenarios where only the features in FV1 are
available, none of these techniques is suitable. Therefore, we can conclude that public
administrations should never allow WSN providers to supply so little network status
data.
Finally, Figure 4.5 also shows that OC-SVM is the only technique resistant to the inclu-
sion of too many features for the algorithms. With the extra features included in FV3,
the rest of the algorithms decrease their performance. SVMs do not depend on the size
of the vector space to be able to properly generalize [113]. This technique shows more
resistance to high dimensionality and to the inclusion of correlated features.
Furthermore, in the scenario using the extra features included in FV3, the detection
performance of the OC-SVM algorithm slightly improves in some cases. However, as
previously stated, these features are currently not sent in any of the analyzed services
in Barcelona. Besides, sending extra features can be detrimental for the network nodes
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and, therefore, the slight increment in the performance is not worth the effort of adding
the extra features in FV3.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we compared diverse techniques to analyze whether the data received
from smart city WSNs are the result of the normal operation of the network or whether
they contain some type of anomaly due to computer attacks. The compared techniques
are either semi-supervised or unsupervised, because obtaining a large dataset of labeled
data with attacks for training purposes is difficult in a smart city. Therefore, super-
vised techniques are not practical in this context. In this comparative study, we used
real data from the smart city of Barcelona to simulate WSNs and implement typical
attacks. Then, using these data, we compared four anomaly detection techniques based
on different principles: Mahalanobis distance, local outlier factor, hierarchical clustering
and OC-SVM. We used various feature vector definitions to identify the optimal network
status fields that the service providers have to include to effectively detect attacks. We
also considered three scenarios with different maximum levels of permitted false positive
rates. As a result of this work, we conclude that OC-SVM is the most suitable tech-
nique in the smart city scenario described in this thesis. Moreover, we justified that the
optimal network status information that should be gathered for proper attack detection
must include the sequence number of the application packet and the battery level. Con-
sidering the most restrictive case with a permitted false positive rate of less than 5%,
our experiments achieved a true positive rate of over 75%. This value is at least 56%
higher than the rates achieved with any of the other compared techniques.
Chapter 5
Intrusion detection pipeline viability
So far, an architecture capable of receiving and indexing big data from smart city WSNs
has been proposed in order to analyze the data in the search for intrusions. Moreover,
a pipeline to carry out these analyses has also been presented. This chapter includes
a study of the viability and scalability of the execution of this pipeline and its subpro-
cesses. Section 5.1 analyzes the criticality of each subprocess in the pipeline and, for the
ones showing a high critical nature, it is shown that they can be parallelized, providing
an implementation with MapReduce. Section 5.2 analyzes the main time constraints
between subprocesses. Finally, Section 5.3 includes a simulation of the most critical
subprocesses and it confirms that, using mid-range servers, a volume of data similar to
that required by a typical smart city service can be processed. Thus, provided enough
hardware resources, the pipeline is scalable.
5.1 Principal subprocesses
Chapter 3 has shown that the pipeline in Figure 5.1 is the basic processing flow from
data reception until the triggering of warnings due to intrusions. This section analyzes
the scalability of the subprocesses in the figure. For each subprocess, we examine its
computational complexity and, for the most complex ones, we provide a MapReduce
schema in order to show that the subprocesses are parallelizable and the general pipeline
is scalable and viable. A SIEM system is the base of the proposed architecture. Therefore,
it can be assumed that the system is capable of gathering and indexing big data.
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Figure 5.1: Intrusion detection pipeline.
5.1.1 Preprocessing
The raw WSN data have to be transformed and indexed in order to ease the subse-
quent steps. The transformation operations for this subprocess described in Section 3.4.1
generally have a very low computational complexity, i.e. O(1), since many are simple
operations applied to a single sample (e.g. unit conversions).
Other operations also require previously received data. However, generally, only the
immediately prior sample is necessary (e.g. battery consumption can be computed by
subtracting previous battery level from current level). This can also be computed in
O(1).
We consider this subprocess as non-critical. We assume that, if the system is capable of
gathering and indexing large amounts of data, then it is also capable of preprocessing
them.
5.1.2 Filtering
In this subprocess, preprocessed data are filtered using comparison operations with other
variables or constants (e.g. variable > value), which have a computational cost of O(1).
Moreover, more complex filter functions, such as a dichotomic search where a variable is
compared against multiple other ordered values have a cost of O(log(n)).
We consider that this is not a critical subprocess. As in the previous case, if the system
is capable of gathering and indexing large amounts of data, then it is also capable of
filtering them.
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5.1.3 Clustering
The aim of this subprocess is dividing data into groups (i.e. clusters) in order to segment
analysis according to the different groups. In this way, administrators reduce the search
space and draw conclusions from a short amount of nodes with common features.
Regarding computational costs, clustering involves algorithms that can be computation-
ally intensive. Nonetheless, once clustering is performed, the clusters do not have to be
recomputed often. Basically, clusters are no longer valid at the moment that variables
for which data have been clusterized change or when nodes are joined or removed from
the network. This does not happen very often, because these variables tend to be stable
(e.g. frequency band, location).
5.1.4 Aggregation
Data aggregation operations have computational costs that depend on the number of
samples to aggregate. For instance, aggregating the last n samples on a single variable
using an operation such as mode has a maximum computational cost of O(nlog(n)).
Other aggregation operations have lower computational costs (e.g. minimum, maximum,
sum, mean and median can be calculated in time O(n)). The most complex aggregation
operations require sorting the list of samples, which is the sub-operation with the highest
cost. However, as this sub-operation can be, at least, partially reused between subsequent
aggregation operations on the same data source, the total computational complexity of
these aggregation operations can be substantially reduced.
Furthermore, n is generally not large for aggregation operations that have time restric-
tions. In these cases, higher time restrictions imply shorter intervals and, therefore, also
imply including fewer samples in the time interval.
Hence, we consider that this subprocess is non-critical and can be done by any big data
system.
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5.1.5 Model computation
As seen in Section 3.3, several types of anomaly detection techniques are suitable for
detecting intrusions in this context. This subprocess can be computationally critical
using any of the suggested techniques for the following three reasons:
• In the case of univariate models, the complexity arises due to the fact that a dif-
ferent model needs to be computed for each variable that requires monitoring. In
this way, although univariate techniques have a low computational complexity (e.g.
Tukey’s method can be computed in O(nlog(n)) or less if the list of samples is al-
ready sorted), the models have to be computed for each of the necessarym variables
in the dataset and, therefore, it is convenient to parallelize the computation.
• In the case of univariate autoregressive models, although they require few historical
samples and they have a low training computational complexity (ARIMA models
on n training samples can be computed in O(n) [114]), their usage has an additional
critical factor because the models can not be reused several times and, therefore,
they have to be recomputed every time new data arrive.
• In the case of multivariate models, the training process is complex. With n as
the number of training samples, the computational complexity of OC-SVM lies
between O(n2) and O(n3) [115].
Hence, relying on both univariate and multivariate models can be computationally ex-
pensive and requires a systematic parallelizable approach to be able to compute all the
models required by administrators with large historical datasets with many variables.
Therefore, we propose a procés based on MapReduce to divide the input data and train
the models in parallel. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudocode for this process. The ba-
sic structure of this algorithm can be used to train either simple univariate or complex
machine learning multivariate models. Algorithm 2 contains auxiliary functions used in
Algorithm 1. Figure 5.2 shows two examples of the usage of the algorithm. In this man-
ner, with enough hardware resources, the system is capable of parallelizing and scaling
this subprocess to train the necessary anomaly detection models.
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Algorithm 1 MapReduce algorithm pseudocode to train anomaly detection models.
Require: record, a sample from the training dataset
Require: G, a tuple with the variable names to group the record variables




for each feature_names ∈ F do
feature_values← get_variable_values(record, feature_names)




Require: key, a new key generated in a map function.






Algorithm 2 High-level description of the auxiliary functions used in Algorithm 1
procedure get_variable_values(record,variable_names)
Returns a subset of record with the variable values defined by variable_names
end procedure
procedure concat(values)
Concatenates all input values separating them by "_".
end procedure
procedure emit(key,value)
Publishes intermediate results containing key and value. These are shuffled with
other intermediate results and fed to a reducer.
end procedure
procedure train(training_dataset)
Trains a model using training_dataset with a predefined anomaly detection algo-
rithm. The model is returned by this function.
end procedure
procedure persists(key,value)
Persists value with key in a key-value system.
end procedure
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(a) Example of the execution of Algorithm 1 to compute univariate models based on low and high
thresholds for all the variables of the input records. The input dataset contains the variables:
id_sensor, lqi and hops. In this example, the required parameters in map function are: record
= < id_sensor, lqi, hops >, G = < ”id_sensor” > and F = << ”lqi” >,< ”hops” >>.
(b) Example of the execution of Algorithm 1 to compute multivariate models based on
OC-SVM per each cluster. The input dataset contains the variables: id_sensor, lqi,
hops and id_cluster. In this example, the required parameters in map function are:
record = < id_sensor, lqi, hops, id_cluster >, G = < ”id_cluster” > and F = <<
”id_sensor”, ”lqi”, ”hops” >>.
Figure 5.2: Examples of training models with Algorithm 1
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5.1.6 Intrusion detection
Intrusion detection using the models trained in the previous section requires steps similar
to those in the training process. The steps for dividing the original data until training
the model (i.e. splitting, mapping and shuffling) are equivalent. Then, a model stored
in the previous subprocess is loaded and used to test if the input data in the intrusion
detection subprocess contain anomalies.
Hence, taking into account these differences, the schema of the algorithm shown in the
previous section is also valid for this subprocess. Moreover, actions involved in this sub-
process are computationally less expensive than for the training subprocess. Loading
a model from a key-value structure (e.g. a hash table) can be done in O(1) on aver-
age. Testing if a value falls within two thresholds can also be done in O(1). For more
complex multivariate models, computational complexity varies depending on the specific
algorithm. The computational cost of testing with non-linear SVMs with a low number
of dimensions increases linearly with the number of support vectors of the model [116].
This number is limited by the size of the training set multiplied by the training set error
rate. This is clearly lower than the computational complexity of training the model.
5.1.7 Alarm management
With the proposed architecture, the detection engines generate alarms. The main respon-
sibilities of this subprocess are to combine and correlate these alarms into new and more
reliable alarms, which are finally warning system administrators. Although the amount
of alarms generated by the detection engines can be too high to be handled by a human,
it is not too high to be handled by a machine using conventional processing techniques.
Hence, this subprocess is not considered critical in terms of processing requirements.
5.2 Temporal constraints
This section studies the strongest temporal constraints that must be satisfied to be able
to execute the pipeline shown in Figure 5.1 in a sustainable manner. When implementing
and configuring detection algorithms, selecting window sizes, etc., it is of utmost impor-
tance to take into account these constraints, in order to avoid undesirable situations,
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such as testing for anomalies with outdated models. These constraints are especially
important in the face of real-time analysis. In the scope of this study, we only take into
account the constraints related with the life cycle of a single model.
First, the variables used in this section are:
• T_stream: average time between consecutive data arrivals from services monitored
by the model.
• T_window: time window used to aggregate data. This variable is not used when
data are not aggregated.
• T_exp_models: average time until the model expires.
• T_train: average time taken training the model.
• T_test: average time taken to test new data with the trained model.
• T_redo_detection: average time taken until the model is reused to test for anoma-
lies on new data.
Below we show basic time constraints between the different steps in order to keep a
sustainable execution cycle of the subprocesses in the pipeline:
T_window >> T_stream (5.1)
T_redo_detection ≥ T_stream (5.2)
T_redo_detection ≥ T_test (5.3)
T_exp_models ≥ T_train (5.4)
Constraints 5.1 and 5.2 are basic in order to perform computation only when there are
new input data and new results can be obtained. Constraint 5.3 ensures that the input
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queue at the intrusion detection subprocess does not constantly increase. Constraint 5.4
ensures that models do not expire before they can be trained.
Complying with these constraints is easy in situations without additional real-time re-
strictions, where intrusion analysis subprocesses can be programmed at the most con-
venient time in terms of system resources. Typical examples of this kind of subprocess
are cluster generation or model training with a large expiring time (T_exp_models >>
T_train).
However, these constraints are particularly important in cases where additional real-time
restrictions have to be considered. Ideally, all input data samples are analyzed in real-
time looking for anomalies. As previously seen, training models and intrusion detection
are the most critical subprocesses in the pipeline. The time required for these subprocess
depends on the specific type of analysis and on the algorithm selected to implement
it. Using detection methods that consume much computational time in networks with
a high data reception rate is generally incompatible with real-time analysis of all the
data samples. In real-time situations, i.e. T_redo_detection = T_stream, another
constraint needs to be considered:
T_test ≤ T_stream (5.5)
In these circumstances, detection algorithms with a very low computational complexity
for testing are adequate. Thus, using precomputed thresholds with a computational
cost of O(1) is suitable for discovering anomalies on single variables. For multivariate
analysis, we proposed using OC-SVM in Chapter 4. We have seen that the complexity
of this machine learning algorithm is also low for testing (i.e. linear with the number of
support vectors of the model).
Nevertheless, there are situations where, ideally, detection results have to be processed
in real time for all new data entering the system, but Constraint 5.5 cannot be satisfied.
In these cases, either the computational cost of the selected algorithm or the data rate is
too high. Therefore, ideally T_redo_detection = T_stream, but T_stream < T_test,
which would break Constraint 5.5. In these situations, in order to maintain a viable
anomaly analysis in real time, it is necessary to decrease the number of times that the
Chapter 5. Intrusion detection pipeline viability 94
test is executed (i.e. increase T_redo_detection). To that end, we distinguish between
analysis with direct streaming data or with aggregated data.
Detecting anomalies on direct streaming data without aggregation requires a sampling
method that does not analyze all data but just selects the most appropriate samples.
For instance, systematic sampling can be used to test one in n samples. In such a way,
system administrators can adjust T_redo_detection according to T_test.
Testing for anomalies on aggregated data relaxes some of the previous constraints. On
the one hand, provided that T_test = T_redo_detection < T_window, every new
data sample is eventually included in at least one time window for aggregation and
subsequently used for testing. For example, a service sending data every minute on
average (T_stream = 1m), where these data are aggregated using 15-minute windows
(T_window = 15m). If, on average, running an anomaly test on new data takes 6
minutes (T_test = 6m), then, by Constraint 5.3, system administrators need to set
T_redo_detection ≥ 6. In this way, although T_redo_detection >> T_stream, every
new observation is aggregated and included in a test sample more than once. However,
if T_test = T_redo_detection > T_window, then the sampling method must select
the most appropriate aggregated data to run the detection tests.
Finally, it is worth noting that there are some types of models that expire shortly,
such as autoregressive models, where T_model_exp = T_stream in the most critical
scenario. In theses cases, besides the previous considerations, T_train ≤ T_stream by
Constraint 5.4. This may imply that models that require large historical training datasets
become unaffordable. However, using models that expire shortly is suitable in situations
where previous samples are highly correlated with current samples. Therefore, small
historical datasets are better suited in these cases. Autoregressive models have already
been used to predict anomalies on WSN data, proving that this type of model can be
executed in very constrained devices and that the best performance results are obtained
including very few previous samples in the models [65].
5.3 Temporal analysis
As previously stated, the most time-critical subprocess in the pipeline is anomaly detec-
tion, especially when there are real-time constraints. It has also been mentioned that
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• Operating System: Ubuntu 14.04 LTS
• Memory (RAM): 8 GB
• Processor: Intel ®Core ™ i5-4210U CPU @ 1.70GHz x 4
• Programming language: Python 2.7
• Machine learning library: Scikit-learn 0.17 [84]
Figure 5.3: Characteristics of the experimental environment
the subprocess with the highest computational complexity is training machine learning
models. Within the MapReduce schema for these subprocesses, the most critical execu-
tion units are in the reduce function. For these reasons, this section includes an empirical
analysis of the time required for these reduce functions.
For this experiment, we generated several datasets with which we trained and tested OC-
SVM. We created a dataset that contained 100,000 samples of 1,000 variables for training
purposes. This represents the equivalent of more than 2 months of observations from a
system that sends 1 observation per minute on average. We also created 2 more datasets
of 1,000 samples and 1,000 variables each. One of the datasets contained anomalies
and the other was anomaly-free. The datasets were created generating random numbers
following a normal distribution X ∼ N(µ, σ2). For the training dataset and the anomaly-
free test dataset, the normal distribution followed X ∼ N(0, 0.9), and for the test data
with anomalies it followed X ∼ N(3, 1). The environment used for this experiment is
shown in Figure 5.3.
In the experiments, we measured the time required to train the models and test for
anomalies. The next section presents the results and discusses the viability of these
algorithms in the smart city context.
5.3.1 Results and discussion
In this experiment, fitting the model using the training dataset required 92.91 minutes
and testing the models on 2,000 samples from the test datasets required 0.019 seconds per
sample. Considering a real-time analysis and setting T_redo_detection = T_stream =
60s (1 observation per minute on average), the temporal constraints 5.3 and 5.5 are
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satisfied. Taking into account these measures, a single machine like the one used in this
experiment (Figure 5.3) would be able to handle testing anomalies on 3,157 samples
every minute. This is 4,546,080 samples every day and more than 31 million samples
every week. For samples of 4 KB, this implies processing 18.18 GB every day and 6,6
TB every year.
Framing this in the context of a smart city, it can be seen that detection via this route
is viable for typical urban services. In Section 2.1, it was explained that the Oyster card
system in London gathers 7 million registers every day, including information about the
user’s ID, the location and a timestamp recorded every time a citizen enters or exits the
public transportation network. Assuming 5 variables for these fields and using large data
types of 10 bytes, such as long doubles, this would result in registers of 50 bytes, which
would yield 350 MB of data every day.
Section 2.1 also mentioned a smart building use case, where about 1 billion registers are
gathered every day. Consider 50-byte registers again, then this generates 50 GB of data
every day.
Therefore, anomaly detection with OC-SVM would be feasible with a single machine
with the characteristics in Figure 5.3 on datasets with a data volume similar to real
urban services like the Oyster card. A small cluster of 3 machines would also be able to
handle the analysis for datasets such as the one in the smart building use case.
These measurements were computed considering non-aggregated data. In many situ-
ations, OC-SVM is tested on aggregated data. Using the testing method described in
Section 5.2 for aggregated data, where T_stream << T_redo_detection < T_window,
then testing datasets like those would become less time intensive. For example, if data
were aggregated in time windows of 20 minutes (T_window = 20m) and tested for
anomalies every 10 minutes (T_redo_detection = 10m), then every data sample would
be aggregated and analyzed twice within two time windows. Through this aggregation
process, a test dataset such as the smart building one would be reduced from 50 GB
and 1 billion registers every day to 5 GB and 100 million a day. This falls within the
values that a single machine like Figure 5.3 can handle. Furthermore, it should be noted
that the server in Figure 5.3 has reduced processing and memory power compared to
conventional servers in data processing centers.
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As seen at the beginning of this section, the training time was 92.91 minutes, which
is much longer than the testing time. This is logical taking into consideration that the
training computational complexity stays between O(n2) and O(n3), with n being the size
of the training dataset. Thus, extremely large historical training datasets are not viable.
Due to Constraint 5.4, it is important that T_exp_models ≥ 92.91 in order to keep a
sustainable cycle concerning the training process. It seems unreasonable to believe that
models trained using 2-month data (86,400 minutes) will expire before 92.91 minutes,
which is 0.001% of the time interval of data on which the model is based. If that were
the case, then other models using fewer samples would be more recommendable.
5.4 Conclusions
This section has reviewed the computational complexity of the subprocesses involved
in the anomaly detection pipeline. We have identified the most critical subprocesses:
model computation and intrusion detection. For these subprocesses, we have presented
algorithms based on the MapReduce paradigm to parallelize them and, therefore, make
them scalable. Furthermore, we have described the principal time constraints of the
pipeline. Taking into account this constraint is important in selecting the most adequate
algorithms to maintain a viable anomaly detection cycle. OC-SVM has proven to be
very suitable in this context. Although the training complexity of this algorithm is high,
the test complexity is low, which is essential in real-time situations. We have empirically
tested that performing anomaly detection using OC-SVM in a big data scenario like
the Oyster card in London could be handled using a server with modest computational
capacity, and the scenario of the city with smart buildings could be processed with a
small cluster of 3 machines.
Chapter 6
Attack Classification schema
In the previous chapters, we have proposed an architecture to gather evidence of mal-
functions in urban WSNs. The two main components of the architecture are a rule-based
detection engine and an anomaly-based detection engine. As previously seen, these en-
gines are capable of triggering alarms in the case of attacks in smart city WSNs. However,
the real challenge is to not only show warnings that indicate that a network has been
compromised, but identify the cause of the problems and the affected components.
This chapter provides guidelines to assist smart city administrators in their response
to incidents, when the detection tools trigger an alarm that involves multiple services,
nodes or frequency bands. These alarms, triggered through a correlation rule as it will
be shown below, not only have a high severity level, but are also difficult to resolve.
Administrators need to find out the attack type, to locate the source of the incident and
the involved devices. In order to facilitate these tasks, this chapter presents a schema
with the basic steps to classify attacks.
The approach followed in this chapter takes into account the requirement that no assump-
tion must be made regarding specific network configurations, available countermeasures,
installed IDS, etc. Considering a generic smart city architecture, the guidelines presented
in this chapter are designed in a general manner in order to be easily adaptable to many
smart city scenarios. Section 6.1 describes the assumptions taken in this regard.
In order to abstract the schema from particular implementations and make it more
generalizable, Section 6.2 identifies the basic alarm types that can be triggered in the
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architecture proposed in Chapter 3. Thus, in the rest of the chapter, we refer to these
alarm types instead of specific alarms caused by specific intrusion detection techniques.
In Section 6.3, we propose seven different attack models based on the study of the effects
that attacks have in the components of smart city WSNs in a generic way. The models
include the most popular attacks against WSNs. Section 6.4 outlines a procedure with
the steps required to classify the received alarms into one of the attack models. This
procedure has been devised taking into account the aforementioned assumptions and
alarm types. In Section 6.5, we propose a set of contingency plans to mitigate the
attacks.
Section 6.6 shows an experimental demonstration with two types of urban WSNs as a
proof of concept of the benefits of the proposed classification schema. This proof of
concept shows how the classification procedure determines the most likely attack types.
Furthermore, it also demonstrates that simple correlation rules, combining alarms from
the two detection engines, can significantly increase the detection rate and, therefore,
generally improve the reliability of the detection system. Finally, Section 6.7 concludes
the chapter.
6.1 Assumptions
As mentioned above, the contributions proposed in this chapter intend to be a guide for
how smart city administrators should behave in the case of attack, taking into account
the effects that attacks cause to the elements of a generic smart city. In any case, each
specific scenario will have to be examined individually and administrators will have to
adapt the models, the schema and the list of contingency measures to their smart city
context. The most relevant assumptions taken to create the guidelines included in this
chapter are listed below:
• Each service uses a single WSN configuration with the same communication pro-
tocols in their nodes. If a single urban service is implemented by two providers
with different networks types, in this chapter, it is considered to be two different
services.
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• Gateways are shared by different WSNs and providers. These devices are assumed
to be connected to the electricity grid, have enough computational power and a
good communication network from and towards the city central servers. Therefore,
gateway providers can use conventional security measures.
• The smart city is considered to be in an advanced state of development with a
high density of sensors and networks. Therefore, if attack traces involve several
providers, networks in several frequency bands, etc.; then the analyzed scenario
includes these required elements.
• Large scale attacks are disclosed as several different attacks. For instance, a jam-
ming attack affecting several frequency bands is considered as several jamming
attacks.
6.2 Alarms
As seen in the Chapter 3, one of the main functions of the rule-based detection engine is
to offer a way to create alarms that are triggered when a rule is fulfilled. In addition, ad-
ministrators can set a severity level and an action to execute when the alarm is triggered
(i.e. run a script). These two properties are very relevant in a smart city, because it is
a very complex system that includes multiple subsystems and devices, and, therefore, it
is likely that many events trigger a plethora of alarms. Obviously, many of these alarms
may not be relevant as a consequence of false alarms or ephemeral malfunctions. Hence,
administrators can label the alarms with a severity code to have a first filter to distin-
guish the alarms that require their immediate attention and also assign an automatic
action to activate a security measure.
The following subsections firstly describe the general alarm types that can be generated
with the detection engines of the proposed architecture. Secondly, the section will focus
on the alarms triggered by correlation rules.
6.2.1 General alarm types
This section will outline the different types of alarms that can be triggered with the
architecture for an intrusion detection platform sketched in Chapter 3. In order to select
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the different categories of alarm types, we have considered the characteristics of the
techniques that trigger the alarms, the analyzed variables and the dynamics of the data.
Thus, in the rest of the chapter, a high level of abstraction is achieved by referring to
the different alarm types instead of mentioning specific intrusion detection techniques,
which would make the schema proposed in this chapter less generalizable.
The different types of alarms that we consider are:
• AT1 - Alarms triggered by simple thresholds
This type of alarm is triggered by simple rules that check whether a variable stays
within pre-set thresholds. These thresholds can be computed manually for certain
variables, for which administrators know a priori their normal boundaries; or they
can be computed using methods to find outliers, such as Tukey’s method (see
Section 2.4.1 for more information). In the case of an attack that triggers an
alarm of this type, administrators can have a valuable hint to find the origin of
the incident, because the rule that triggers the alarm is generally associated with
a single variable of a single node. However, by focusing on just one variable,
several attacks may show the same effects and, therefore, other evidence needs to
be gathered.
• AT2 - Alarms triggered by complex models
The alarms triggered by complex anomaly detection models, such as OC-SVM,
allow administrators to disclose attacks that leave more subtle evidence than just
single variables going over thresholds. Thus, these allow monitoring the normal
state of several variables, involving different nodes and services at the same time.
Compared to AT1 alarms, these alarms allow administrators to know that data are
anomalous as a whole and, therefore, they have less information about the specific
variables or nodes that are affected.
• AT3 - Alarms triggered by time series analysis
Time series analysis is useful in smart cities because many services generate times
series data. In these cases, new observations are closely related to previous ones.
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For these types of data, static thresholds are sometimes inadequate. Mathematical
models, capable of predicting future values, are more suitable to point out the
real values that deviate from the forecasts, which, therefore, can be considered
anomalous.
• AT4 - Alarms triggered by correlation
These types of alarms result from establishing certain relationships between an
attack and its effects in an area or in some network components. These effects are
in turn detected by the other alarm types. Therefore, these types of alarms are
created to aggregate other alarms into a single one.
When system administrators create any of the alarms described above, they have to
assign a severity level to the alarm. Administrators then have an easy way to filter the
alarms that will actually receive their attention. Identifying the severity of the alarms
is generally a specific task dependant on the specific smart city and on the security
policies. For instance, administrators can flag an alarm as severe if it is implemented on
an especially critical service or node; or if the alarm is implemented on a highly reliable
protocol and, therefore, any sign of anomaly is a clear sign of attack. Moreover, as it
will be seen in the next section, it is also recommended to create AT4 alarms with a
high-severity level, because they are more reliable and can affect several systems.
6.2.2 Alarms triggered by correlation rules
A correlation rule is a type of rule that is used to group alarms that have some kind
of relationship. The new alarm triggered by a correlation rule can be considered more
trustworthy than the alarms that it is composed of, since it gets triggered only if several
unwanted situations have already triggered some alarms. Therefore, alarms triggered by
correlation rules can be considered more critical, not only because they are more reliable,
but also because the alarms that it is composed of may come from several services,
devices, providers, etc. Moreover, correlation rules allow administrators to reduce the
number of alarms that require their attention. For instance, creating a correlation rule
to group the alarms by location in a WSN reduces all the alarms triggered by a source
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of interference to a single alarm, instead of receiving individual alarms from each of the
sensor nodes in the area that receives the interference.
Moreover, administrators can use correlation rules to implement signatures for known
attacks, for which administrators can clearly identify the attack traces. In this way,
alarms triggered by these rules will not only be reliable, but they will also straightaway
point to a specific attack type. The creation of correlation rules is highly dependent on
the WSNs that are deployed together, their configurations, and, in general, the specific
scenario. Therefore, defining a methodology to create correlation rules falls out of the
scope of this thesis.
However, as seen in the examples in Chapter 3, general purpose correlation rules can
be easily implemented in most scenarios and, as the proof of concept of Section 6.6 will
show, this can significantly improve the detection success. As a general guideline, we
recommend that smart city administrators create correlation rules to group the alarms
received within a certain time interval triggered by devices sharing certain characteristics,
such as a nearby location, the frequency band, the provider, the gateway, etc.
In this way, once a severe alarm built from a correlation rule is received, administrators
can begin to collect more insights about the compromised components, providers, etc.
The next sections provide some guidelines to assist administrators to this end.
6.3 Attack models
Attacks in WSNs are traditionally detected analyzing particular parameters from each
of the affected communication layers. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, from the
smart city administrators’ perspective, it is unrealistic to count on the availability of all
the parameters and maintaining very specific detection systems for each WSN would be
unmanageable. Therefore, the models in this attack schema are a general classification,
based on the anomaly traces that most common attacks in WSN leave on the affected
data described in Section 3.2.1 and on the attack’s geographical influence. For each
attack model, a list of attack candidates is provided. These are the most common
attacks reported in the literature (see more details in Section 2.3.1). Figure 6.1 shows
graphical representations of the seven models. These models are described as follows:
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Model 1: Vertical attacks
Description: Attacks that show vertical attack traces (i.e. from a group of node
leaves to the base station) on a single WSN. The main aims of these attacks
is to obstruct one or more paths in order to increase the arrival time of the
packets from the target leaves, to crash intermediate routing nodes, to decrease
node batteries or to provoke a general DoS.
Affected data: Application data, packet latency, battery level.
Geographical influence: Attack traces along large network paths starting near
the leaves and ending near the base station.
Attack candidates: Path-based DoS, overwhelm, misdirection, spoof, alter or
replay routing information, wormhole, sybil to an important routing node,
blackhole on an important routing node, sinkhole.
Model 2: Transmission medium attacks
Description: Attacks that affect nearby nodes using the same frequency bands
or MAC protocols. Other bands or protocols are not affected. Basically,
attackers take advantage of the transmission medium in order to prevent the
proper delivery or reception of packets from certain nodes. These attacks
applied to routing nodes also hamper the correct communication of other
nodes outside of the attacker’s direct influence area.
Affected data: Network status data (e.g. RSSI, SNR), application data, packet
latency, battery level.
Geographical influence: Reduced area of nearby nodes.
Attack candidates: Unfairness, collision, jamming.
Model 3: Locally dispersed attacks
Description: Attacks that affect dispersed nodes from a single WSN with the
main goal of creating delays, dropping packets and depleting node batteries.
Affected data: Application data, packet latency, battery level.
Geographical influence: No geographical influence.
Attack candidates: Misdirection, spoof, alter or replay routing information, sybil,
data tampering, wormhole, selective forwarding, sinkhole.
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Model 4: Widely dispersed attacks
Description: Attacks that affect dispersed nodes from several WSNs. Attackers
aim to reduce the proper operation of one or several WSNs. In this case, at-
tackers do not use constant attack techniques, which would be more effective,
in order to cover up their intentions and delay the moment of their discovery.
Affected data: Application data.
Geographical influence: No geographical influence.
Attack candidates: Selective forwarding at a gateway, unfairness at a gateway
(not-constant), collision at a gateway (not-constant), jamming at a gateway
(not-constant).
Model 5: Widely intensive attacks
Description: Attacks that affect a great percentage of nodes from several WSNs
using the same gateway. Attackers use these techniques to completely stop
the service provided by one or more WSNs.
Affected data: Application data, battery level.
Geographical influence: Wide area of nearby nodes.
Attack candidates: Blackhole at a gateway, unfairness at a gateway (constant),
collision at a gateway (constant), jamming at a gateway (constant), other
attacks that crash or isolate the gateway.
Model 6: Local service alteration attacks
Description: Attacks that affect several nearby nodes from the same WSN. The
main goal is to alter application information from an area. The attackers
either drop application packets or send false information.
Affected data: Application data.
Geographical influence: Reduced area of nearby nodes.
Attack candidates: Blackhole, sinkhole, sybil, data tampering.
Model 7: Single node attacks
Description: Attacks that aim at depleting the batteries of a single node. This
becomes very critical when attackers aim at an important router node in
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(a) Model 1: vertical attacks (b) Model 2: transmission medium attacks
(c) Model 3: locally dispersed attacks (d) Model 4: widely dispersed attacks
(e) Model 5: widely intensive attacks (f) Model 6: local service alteration attacks
(g) Model 7: single node attacks
Figure 6.1: Graphical representation of the seven attack models
network areas with few paths to the sink. Several of these attacks on each
path divide the network.
Affected data: Battery level.
Geographical influence: No geographical influence.
Attack candidates: De-synchronization, flooding, sinkhole, collision.
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6.4 Classification procedure
As previously seen, the proposed architecture can gather a plethora of AT1, AT2 and AT3
alarms from many different nodes triggered by the same attack. Section 6.2.2 has shown
that administrators can implement correlation rules in order to group some of these
alarms and, thus, trigger a high severity AT4 alarm to warn them when the evidence
of attacks is strong. Then, at the point of receiving an AT4 alarm, administrators have
to start inquiring to find out the type of attack and which elements in the network are
compromised. This section provides guidelines to classify the alarms into one of the
seven models described above. In this way, using the models provide administrators
with information about the most likely attacks that fit the evidence.
Figure 6.2 presents the workflow with the classification schema. As the figure shows,
the process begins when administrators receive a high severity AT4 alarm (step (a)).
Then, administrators have to decide which other alarms registered in the system could
be related to the incident and, therefore, have to be collected for analysis (step (b)). In
general, these related alarms are the ones triggered by nearby nodes during a short time
interval before or after the incident, or by other components of the same network, or
the same provider, etc. As a result of step (b) administrators identify a set of alarms
that are relevant for the classification of the incident. In the subsequent steps, this set
of alarms is analysed to answer the following questions:
• Are multiple nodes affected? (step (c)).
• Are the affected nodes geolocalized together? (step (d)).
• Are multiple services affected? (steps (e) and (k)).
• Are multiple frequency bands affected? (step (f)).
• Is the gateway involved in the attack? (steps (g), (l) and (m)).
• Are the alarms in the set of alarms relevant? (step (i)).
• Do vertical paths show signs of being affected? (step (j)).
It is worth noting that verifying whether a gateway is involved in the attack is usually the
responsibility of the gateway provider, who has full access to the gateway. Moreover, as
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Figure 6.2: Procedure to classify attacks into seven attack models according to the
evidence in the alarms triggered by the detection engines.
mentioned in Section 6.1, we consider that gateways are not constrained in terms of pro-
cessing power, are connected to the electricity grid and have reliable telecommunication
connections. Therefore, providers can perform complete analysis on the gateways with
conventional security tools (e.g. antivirus, IDS) to test if they have been compromised.
In addition to the analysis through the aforementioned questions, the workflow eventu-
ally requires splitting the alarm set into several subsets according to a certain criterion
(e.g. by frequency band) (steps (h) and (n)). Splitting the alarm set is important to
differentiate between several alarms due to different incidents occurring in the same de-
vices around the same time. When there is no model clearly identifiable from the alarm
set, as loops (c) - (i) and (c) - (n) show, we propose an iterative process that divides
the alarm set into several partitions and each of them is used to start the classification
procedure again. Thus, alarms that are not related are divided into different partitions
and, therefore, analyzed separately. These unrelated alarms from the same area at the
same moment in time can be due to concurrent attacks, false alarms, etc.
Lastly, the final states of the procedure in Figure 6.2 show the attack model that fits
the evidence given by an alarm set. The states where third party services or important
communication nodes are affected are indicated by a red box.
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Below, in order to illustrate the classification process, an example incident is resolved:
1. A high severity alarm (AT4) calls the smart city administrators’ attention (step
(a)) to a parking WSN controlled by provider A. This AT4 alarm is defined with
a correlation rule that groups three or more AT1 alarms (triggered if the received
RSSI is above a threshold) in a two hour window. Administrators look in the system
for other alarms in the same time window sharing the same area or equipment (step
(b)). They find other AT1 alarms from an environmental WSN, which is controlled
by provider B. In this case, the AT1 alarms were programmed with a simple rule
that would check that the data from the sensors was received in the scheduled
intervals. All these alarms make up the alarm set used by the administrators to
classify the incident.
2. At this point, administrators start analysing the alarm set by answering the ques-
tions proposed in the schema. Firstly, they run a simple query to determine if
multiple nodes are affected (step (c)). The result of this query is positive.
3. Administrators visually inspect the nodes to figure out if the affected nodes are
geolocalized together (step (d)). The result of this query is positive.
4. Administrators verify if multiple services are affected in all the alarms (step (e)).
The result of this query is positive (because the parking service and the environ-
mental monitoring service are affected).
5. Administrators make another simple query to check if multiple bands are affected
(step (f)). The result of this query is negative (because the WSNs from the two
services are configured in the same frequency band).
6. Administrators conclude that the analyzed WSNs are under an attack from model
number 2. Moreover, the affected data that triggered the alarms supports this con-
clusion, i.e. RSSI over the limit in the parking WSN and packet latency increased
in the environmental WSN. This is a transmission medium attack, where the source
of the attack affects nearby nodes using the same frequency bands and/or MAC
protocols. In this type of attack, the affected nodes can be from different WSNs
and different providers. Likely attacks are: unfairness, collision and jamming.
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With this procedure, we point out the most likely attack model, we limit the affected
nodes, the area and the providers. Additionally, we also indicate if the attack is com-
promising the transmission medium (i.e. blue mark), a gateway (i.e. red mark) or the
provider’s infrastructure (i.e. green mark). Moreover, the previous section listed the
attack candidates for each model. The next section recommends contingency plans to
mitigate the short and medium term consequences of the attacks.
6.5 Contingency plans
At the end of the procedure in the previous section, the administrators have a sharper
picture of the cause of the alarms and, therefore, they can contact the service providers
to look for a solution to the problem. In general, solving this type of attack can be a long
process, since it involves coordinating several parties and analyzing many devices, which
can be difficult to access. Hence, at this moment, besides looking for a solution to patch
the possible vulnerabilities, it is also paramount to mark the data from the compromised
services and to avoid new data becoming compromised.
Below, basic recommendable strategies to mitigate the possible negative consequences of
the attacks are listed. These contingency plans are divided in short and medium-term
actions depending on whether other services are affected.
Short-term actions:
Transmission medium compromised
• Data from the compromised service in quarantine
• Data from nearby services in quarantine
• Exclusion area required
Gateway compromised
• Data from the compromised service in quarantine
• Data from other services in the compromised gateway in quarantine
• If other gateways available, then compromised gateway excluded
Provider’s security compromised
• Data from all the services of the provider in quarantine
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Medium-term actions:
Transmission medium compromised
• Data from the compromised service and the nearby services excluded from
learning, statistical and analysis processes
Gateway compromised
• Data from the compromised service and other services in the compromised
gateway excluded from learning, statistical and analysis processes
Provider’s security compromised
• Data from the services of the compromised provider excluded from learn-
ing, statistical and analysis processes
Putting the measures listed above in place avoids the situations where other services
compromise new data and where compromised data are used in an urban operation.
For instance, in the short-term, we propose establishing exclusion areas when attacks
compromise the transmission medium. In this way, mobile devices using WSN technology
avoid entering areas where their transmissions can be in danger. In the medium-term, we
propose that data from compromised devices should be excluded from business analytical
tasks to avoid drawing wrong conclusions. For example, the municipality could decide to
expand a parking facility, basing the analysis on compromised WSN data from a parking
lot indicating overuse.
Depending on the critical nature of the affected services, it is possible that other contin-
gency strategies are required. Hence, administrators have to analyze the details of each
use case to figure out the necessary additional countermeasures.
6.6 Proof of concept
This section includes a proof of concept to demonstrate the use of the proposed classifica-
tion schema to detect and locate a data availability attack. This type of attack is difficult
to detect, can involve several services from different WSNs from different providers and
requires the analysis of multiple types of data. The implemented attack in this proof of
concept simulates a 20% selective forwarding attack that affects a wide area with dis-
persed nodes from several WSNs from different providers. Selective forwarding attacks
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become more obvious as the dropped packet rate and the number of affected nodes in-
crease, and when it affects a reduced and non-dispersed area. Therefore, we analyze the
benefits of using the defined schema in a highly complex detection scenario.
6.6.1 Scenario description
In this section, we build a scenario for the demonstration and we analyze the data using
the core packages included in R [108] and the packages e1071 [109] and caret [117] for
the OC-SVM classification and FPC [118] for the clustering algorithms. The original
data came from two Barcelona service providers from July to November 2015. The
two services collect data from street parkings and sound meters. The data from the
parking service include the gateway identifier used by each packet to send the data
from the parking sensors to the central servers. The sound data do not include this
information. For this proof of concept, it is necessary to extend the real data to have
a dataset with the minimum amount of information to be able to simulate attacks and,
subsequently, perform anomaly analysis. Therefore, in order to have a proper dataset
for this demonstration, the following actions are performed:
• The sound meters are placed in the area of the parking network respecting the
layout of both networks. Figure 6.3 shows the node position in both networks.
• A gateway identifier is assigned to each packet received from the sound network.
The assignment of a gateway to each sound packet is based on the gateway com-
putational load. Thus, gateways processing many parking network packets receive
fewer sound packets. As it will be seen later on, this gateway identifier is only used
to simulate the attack. When we perform the analysis later, the gateway identifier
is considered unknown in the sound packets.
• The data types described in Section 3.2.1 are received at the data center from
diverse services and are generally considered available to any service. However,
in this scenario, the sound service does not provide the sequence number of the
application packets, which can be used to easily calculate the application packet
loss. Therefore, the packet loss rate is added to the sound meter data.
• A normal packet loss rate (i.e. not due to attacks) is also considered. There is
a wide variability on ordinary packet loss rates in WSNs, depending on several
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Figure 6.3: Sensor positions and division of the parking sensor nodes in clusters.
network characteristics, such as the communication protocols or the node density.
In [119], the authors performed measurements using the Collection Tree Protocol
(CTP), which is one of the most popular routing protocols in WSNs, and they found
end-to-end packet delivery rates from 90.5% to 99.9%. Thus, in this simulation,
the sound monitoring service has a conservative 90% packet delivery rate (i.e. 10%
packet loss rate without attack).
In this scenario, we simulate a selective forwarding attack in one of the gateways, where
20% of the received packets are randomly dropped. This causes data loss from sensors
belonging to the two services spread throughout the neighborhood. This scenario, with
only two services, is a basic configuration for a smart city and demonstrates the value
of the proposed classification schema. Scenarios including more services and providers
would increase the complexity of the analysis, but, at the same time, more alarms from
other WSNs would be trigger and, then, there would be more evidence of the attack,
which would enhance the value and the results of the classification procedure.
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6.6.2 Analysis
This section presents the basic procedures to detect anomalies and trigger alarms (Sec-
tion 6.6.2.1). Thus, this proof of concept briefly shows how to apply the techniques
proposed and reviewed in the previous chapters. Moreover, it shows the importance of
implementing correlation rules and demonstrates how to use the classification schema
proposed in this chapter (Section 6.6.2.2).
6.6.2.1 Basic detection analysis
In this section, a rule-based technique with a predefined threshold (AT1 type in Sec-
tion 6.2.1) and an anomaly-based technique (AT2 type in Section 6.2.1) are used on
aggregated data from the parking and the sound services to unveil the attacks affecting
the smart city.
In order to perform the detection analysis, we first divide the data from this simulation
into three sets. 50% of the data is used for training purposes, 25% is used as a validation
data to tune the parameters of the algorithms and the last 25% is used as a test dataset.
The selective forwarding attack is only applied to the validation and the test data.
We implement three types of alarms to detect the attacks:
• We use rule-based detection on the sound data. From this service, we ag-
gregate the number of lost application packets in one hour windows and we define
a threshold to determine the maximum number of lost application packets that is
considered normal (i.e. not due to an attack). Setting a high threshold implies
decreasing the detection rate (i.e. number of detected attacks divided by the num-
ber of total attacks) and the false positive rate (i.e. instances that are incorrectly
classified as attacks divided by the number of total instances that are not attacks).
• We use OC-SVM on the parking data. In this case, the procedure to detect
attacks has the following steps:
1. We group the sensor nodes into clusters by location using DBSCAN[120].
Figure 6.3 shows the division by clusters.
2. We aggregate the number of changes in the parking spots per cluster in one
hour windows.
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3. We use OC-SVM to train and test a model in order to verify if the num-
ber of changes in each cluster in each window at the corresponding hour of
the day is normal. The OC-SVM hyperparameters are used to test different
combinations of detection and false positive rates.
• We create a simple correlation rule (AT4 type in Section 6.2.1) that is triggered
when various alarms from any of the previous two detection techniques have been
triggered in one hour. In order build this correlation rule, we compare the detection
rate and the false positive rate of varying amounts of alarms triggered by any of
the two detection engines. As shown below, by decreasing the number of required
alarms in the correlation rule, we can gradually increase both the detection rate
and the false positive rate. The results are shown in Figure 6.4.
Generally, alarms based on thresholds are more reliable than alarms triggered by machine
learning techniques. If an attacker performing a selective forwarding in the gateway
drops a large amount of packets, then the AT1 alarm implemented with a threshold
for the number of lost application packets from the sound service would be enough in
order to discover the attack. However, the most challenging situations arise when the
attacks affect few sound packets and many parking packets, which is the scenario that
is implemented in this proof of concept. Thus, we demonstrate the advantages of using
correlation rules and the classification schema proposed in this chapter. Figures 6.4 and
6.5 show the performance of the detection techniques in this scenario. Figure 6.4 shows
that, in general, for a false positive rate lower than 25%, the combination of alarms from
the first two techniques in a correlation rule outperforms the other techniques operating
separately. In the smart city context, the false positive rate must be kept low to avoid
overwhelming system administrators. As seen in Figure 6.5, setting a maximum 5%
false positive rate implies that the detection rate using correlation detection is more
than 1.5 times higher than using only OC-SVM and more than 3.5 times higher than
using only rule-based detection. Therefore, this outcome shows that administrators can
significantly improve detection results by implementing simple correlation rules as shown
in this example.
These results are particularly interesting when taking into account that the detection
scenario is highly complex due to a 20% selective forwarding dropping rate (only 10%
more than the normal loss rate for the sound network) and the difficulty of detecting
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Figure 6.4: Evolution of the detection rate and the false positive rate of the three
techniques. In the rule-based detection, increasing the packet loss threshold decreases
the detection rate and the false positive rate. In the OC-SVM detection, a higher value
of the hyperparameter ν increases the detection rate and the false positive rate. In the
detection by correlation, including more alarms in the correlation rule decreases the
detection rate and the false positive rate.
anomalies in nodes spread in a wide area. There is also a need to detect the attacks
within a one hour window, which allows time to apply short-term contingency actions.
Therefore, the performance of the proposed detection process would increase in scenarios
with a higher dropping rate, where the attack is focused on a narrow area or without
short-term contingency requirements.
This simulated detection process also shows that alarms triggered by the correlation
rule must be considered as highly severe. The other alarms are also important to trace
incidents in the smart city, but they are less reliable and provide less information about
the incidents than correlation rules. In the next section, starting from the reception of a
highly severe alarm, the proposed schema is used to classify the incident into an attack
model.
6.6.2.2 Enhanced analysis with attack classification
In this proof of concept, AT1 and AT2 alarms can be constantly triggered and, therefore,
do not deserve administrators’ attention until an AT4 alarm is received. Upon receiving
an AT4 alarm (step (a) in the schema shown in Figure 6.2), administrators can proceed
with the other steps in the classification procedure:
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Figure 6.5: Detection rate comparison between the three techniques at a 5% false
positive rate.
1. Administrators must retrieve other alarms from the same service, from the same
area or from some network that shares important components with the network
that triggered the alarm (step (b)). Thus, in this scenario, alarms from the parking
and sound service have to be retrieved and make up the base alarm set for this
analysis.
2. The answer to the question Multiple nodes affected? is Yes (step (c)).
3. The answer to the question Nodes geolocalized together? is No (step (d)), since
Figure 6.6 shows that the anomalies detected in the sound sensors and parking
clusters are sparsely distributed.
4. The answer to the question Multiple services affected? is Yes (step (k)).
5. At this point administrators could have already taken preventive countermeasures
involving the transmission medium and the gateway. They should request the
gateway provider to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the gateway (step (m))
to confirm that the networks are under an attack model number 4. As it can be seen
in Section 6.3, this corresponds to a widely dispersed attack, where the most likely
attack candidates aim at the gateway and match the traces of a selective forwarding,
a non-constant unfairness, a non-constant collision or a non-constant jamming. In
this situation, the basic recommended contingency strategies involve marking an
exclusion area near the gateway, redirecting WSN traffic to other gateways (if
Chapter 6. Attack classification schema 118
Figure 6.6: Sound sensors and parking sensor clusters where the attack has been
detected.
possible) and quarantining the data from the compromised gateway, the nearby
services and other services that were using this gateway.
As this example has shown, using the classification schema and taking into account the
alarms from the smart city WSNs as a whole, smart city administrators not only detect
anomalies in a more reliable way, but are also provided with a clearer picture of the
attacks causing the incidents.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have extended the intrusion detection platform presented in the
previous chapters with a schema to classify the evidence left by attacks against smart city
WSNs into seven different attack models. This schema provides smart city administrators
with guidelines to identify the attacks and the compromised network components. These
models have been proposed by taking into account the effects that the attacks have on
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the components of smart city WSNs in a generic way. For each attack model, we have
provided a list of attack types to narrow down the most likely cause of attack and we have
provided a set of contingency plans to mitigate short and medium term consequences of
the attacks. This schema does not claim to be comprehensive and, therefore, it does not
include all the possible attacks for all possible smart city configurations. This schema
has been designed to be adaptable to many smart cities and it should be treated as a
guideline to develop a security and incident response system for smart city WSNs.
This chapter has also shown that the combined use of rule-based detection and OC-SVM
by means of simple correlation rules can significantly improve detection results. The
combination of these techniques in a correlation rule can outperform the other techniques
operating separately, and this has been shown in a complex detection scenario with a
20% selective forwarding dropping rate (only 10% more than the normal loss rate for
the sound network). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach towards
studying the effects of correlating WSN security analysis of different services in the smart
city. The proof of concept has also exemplified the procedure to follow to figure out the
most likely attacks and components compromising two WSNs.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In recent years, smart city projects are gaining importance in the urban development
of many cities around the world. This has involved acquiring new ways of managing
the cities, which have generally been based on technological solutions that gather and
process large amounts of city data. To this end, public administrations, which aim at
developing smart city solutions, normally deploy WSNs in order to collect data from
the streets and, in this way, obtain information about the operation of the metropolitan
infrastructures.
Nonetheless, a massive deployment of WSNs in an unprotected environment, like the
streets, raises some security concerns. Furthermore, public administrations are gener-
ally outsourcing the installation and maintenance of the WSNs to external providers.
These facts create scenarios with several barriers to security, from which, this thesis has
highlighted three. Firstly, outsourcing potentiates the heterogeneous environment of the
smart city. Each urban service demands a different level of security and each provider
offers a different solution to implement a system. Secondly, network devices adminis-
tered by the providers become less accessible for the public administration. This, in
many cases, is an impediment to access system logs and to monitor the security health
of the network. And thirdly, WSNs are generally designed to be highly efficient in order
to reduce energy consumption and extend battery life. This results, in some cases, in
the fact that downstream communication is not implemented, which hardens software
120
Chapter 7. Conclusions and future work 121
updates, key exchange, etc. Therefore, finding generalizable security solutions to pro-
tect the WSNs that can cope with the heterogeneity of the smart city and that are also
efficient and adaptable enough to be installed in the sensor nodes is unfeasible.
Currently, in order to protect the WSNs, public administrations include security clauses
in the service-level agreements with the external providers. Accordingly, security mech-
anisms are in hands of the providers. Generally, the providers embed countermeasures
based on cryptography, obfuscation, frequency hopping and so on in the sensor nodes.
However, these security measures are only effective if they are properly applied and
maintained, and, in front of severe attacks, they are totally futile. Thus, in this scenario,
smart city administrators must have mechanisms to verify their WSNs operation, so that
they can urge, if necessary, external providers to apply the required security measures. In
this context, this research work aims at contributing to increase smart city WSN security
from the point of view of the smart city administrators. The rest of this chapter presents
the conclusions of this thesis in Section 7.1, and future work directions in Section 7.2.
7.1 Conclusions
As a first contribution in this dissertation, we have proposed a centralized architecture
to gather all the available application and network status data from the urban WSNs
in order to analyze them and disclose attacks. In this way, this architecture contributes
towards a centralised intrusion detection platform for smart cities. The proposed archi-
tecture has been designed to be non-intrusive and transparent to the WSN providers.
The architecture design also takes into account that different smart cities require differ-
ent services and that different providers use different technologies. The architecture and
the algorithms included in this thesis intend to be portable to many smart city models.
Consequently, we studied the characteristics of current smart city projects and we have
abstracted the proposed architecture from any specific smart city configuration. Hence,
the proposed system is easily integrable and adaptable to many smart cities, and the
proposed detection algorithms can be applied in many WSN types.
In the proposed architecture, intrusion detection is basically handled by two detection
engines: a rule-based detection engine and an anomaly-based detection engine. The rule-
based detection engine looks for patterns of attacks that have previously been recorded
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in signature databases. Although this mechanism is highly effective to detect certain
attacks, it has the main drawback that unknown attacks, for which there are still no
signatures, go unnoticed. Moreover, creating rules that involve many variables becomes
too complex and difficult to maintain, and defining static thresholds for highly dynamic
systems is sometimes unfeasible. On the other hand, anomaly-based detection normally
uses machine learning and statistical techniques to discover data that deviate from nor-
mality. In this way, these types of techniques are capable of disclosing unknown attacks.
However, they are not fully reliable and they trigger a certain amount of false alarms.
Therefore, it is necessary to combine the two types of detection engines in order to avoid
an excessive amount of false positives and also to be able to detect unknown attacks.
Incorporating a correlation system which brings together alarms triggered by both de-
tection engines has significantly shown an increase of the detection rate. Additionally, it
reduces the number of relevant alarms that need the administrator’s attention.
This thesis has put more focus on the anomaly-based detection engine because it can
offer more flexibility and adaptability to different WSNs than the rule-based engine.
Instead of using static rules, the anomaly-based engine uses mathematical models that
are constantly updated using the data gathered from the WSNs. In this way, this engine
is responsible to create the models that define the normal behavior of the variables and,
then, use these models to verify that new data from the WSNs come without anomalies.
This engine has to be capable of finding normality boundaries for single variables and
also identify not normal situations considering the relationship between several variables
at the same time. In this thesis, we have studied several multivariate anomaly detection
techniques, and we have concluded that OC-SVM is very suitable in this context. This
is a semi-supervised machine learning technique, which has given good detection results
in several scenarios incorporating in the models different application and network status
variables from the different layers of the WSN communication protocols. As a result of
the studies included in this dissertation, we have determined that the sequence number of
the application packet and the battery level are the minimum network status information
that providers have to send from the sensor nodes to the smart city central servers to be
able to run successful anomaly analysis.
Furthermore, this thesis has shown that intrusion detection with the proposed methods
requires several steps. For instance, data have to be pre-processed and aggregated, and
Chapter 7. Conclusions and future work 123
machine learning models need to be trained and, then, anomaly analysis can be per-
formed. We have analyzed the computational complexity of the different steps and we
have identified model computation and intrusion detection as the most critical subpro-
cesses among these steps. On the one hand, model computation has to be considered
critical, because the computational complexity of training machine learning models is
generally very high. However, this action is executed very seldom. On the other hand,
anomaly detection is generally computationally inexpensive, but it has to be executed
very often. This thesis validates that the pipeline involving all the required steps is viable
even in scenarios involving big data without having to rely on a hardware architecture
with exceptionally high computational resources.
Additionally, one of the main challenges for smart city administrators is not only to
detect that an attack is compromising the WSNs of the external providers, but also to
identify the specific attack. This thesis has provided guidelines to gather the evidences
of the attack and then point out one of seven proposed attack models. In this way, smart
city administrators narrow down the possible attack type affecting their networks and
they can also figure out the compromised devices and some mitigation strategies to limit
short and medium term harmful consequences of the attacks.
Summing up, in this thesis we have proposed a system that contributes to improve
smart city WSN security in a generic manner. The solutions proposed in this thesis are
suitable to be adapted and deployed to several smart city models. In order to adapt
the proposed solutions, smart cities need to further study the consequences of attacks
in their particular scenarios and extend or reduce the solutions proposed in this thesis
according to their circumstances. In this way, the proposed solutions can help smart city
administrators to enhance security, to mitigate the consequences of attacks, to increase
data quality, to monitor that providers apply the necessary security countermeasures in
their networks, and, in general, to improve WSN security as a whole.
As a result of our work, we have seen that intrusion detection in a smart city is a very
complex problem. A black-box solution with a multipurpose detection algorithm that
covers most of the attacks for most of the configurations is not feasible. This thesis is a
first contribution on this research field and it does not aim to include a comprehensive
intrusion detection system capable of disclosing any attack targeting any possible business
case in any type of smart city. Therefore, smart city administrators can use the tools
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proposed in this thesis as a basis and adapt these solutions to the particular cases in
their cities.
7.2 Future work
This thesis has presented generic methods that can be used in many smart city situa-
tions focusing on problems concerning typical attacks that can affect several smart city
WSNs. As future work, it would be of great value to provide the best ways to detect
attacks taking into account the specificities of the typical services included in the smart
cities. Although we have already suggested certain algorithms to set thresholds up, data
integrity attacks have different effects for application data in the different services and,
therefore, in order to have more effective detection, it is necessary to study how attacks
affect the most important variables on each service or in the network, and then find the
best algorithm to detect them. For example, it would be useful to find the best way to
automatically determine the boundaries for sound meters or for the RSSI in the most
used WSNs configurations.
Moreover, it is also important to enhance the guidelines provided in this thesis with a
methodology to configure the necessary parameters to run the proposed intrusion detec-
tion processes. This would be very useful, for instance, to set up the OC-SVM parameters
or to find the most adequate time window size to aggregate data. Furthermore, the guide-
lines of the thesis have to also be enhanced with a methodology to build correlation rules
integrating alarms from the two detection engines.
It also remains as future work to find a clustering methodology to divide the networks in
small areas, with which administrators can apply the detection techniques and withdraw
relevant conclusions bearing in mind the compromised frequency bands, protocols, node
location, etc. The experiments performed in this thesis have used small networks or the
scenarios were divided ad-hoc. However, in a real smart city situation with multiple
WSNs, these tasks need to be handled by algorithms in order to make them scalable.
Finally, we have proposed guidelines that narrow down the list of candidate attacks
compromising a system, the affected components and providers. However, in a real smart
city it is necessary to have an automatic system including a comprehensive list of attacks
and other possible causes of network malfunctioning. The rule-based detection engine is
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theoretically capable of identifying any type of known attack if it leaves traces on the
data. However, as far as we know, there are currently no public signature databases to
identify attacks in this context. Additionally, if large datasets of labeled data from the
smart city WSNs were available, then, it would be possible to use supervised machine
learning algorithms to train models to classify the anomalies into specific attacks. The
availability of large datasets of labeled data would also allow studying the performance
of deep learning techniques in this context. The analysis of these type of techniques also




This Appendix contains supplementary materials for Chapter 4. Each table shows the
results of the experiments considering a different feature vector and/or a different PFPR.
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Table A.1: Comparative study results for the FV1 dataset with a very restrictive
PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.60 0.71 0.73
All attacks lofactor 0.12 0.05 0.06
All attacks mahalanobis 0.05 0.05 0.02
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.12 0.06 0.07
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.63 0.67 0.77
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.21 0.05 0.12
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.10 0.05 0.05
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.18 0.06 0.10
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.62 0.70 0.76
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.13 0.05 0.07
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.10 0.05 0.05
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.07 0.06 0.04
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.77 0.26 0.79
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.04 0.05 0.02
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.02 0.05 0.01
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.08 0.06 0.04
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.54 0.97 0.73
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.11 0.05 0.06
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.03 0.05 0.01
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.06 0.06 0.03
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.57 0.95 0.79
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.08 0.05 0.05
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.05 0.05 0.03
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.07 0.06 0.03
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.58 0.90 0.78
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.05 0.05 0.03
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.03 0.05 0.02
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.14 0.06 0.08
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.61 0.72 0.75
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.07 0.05 0.04
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.03 0.05 0.02
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.15 0.06 0.08
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Table A.2: Comparative study results for the FV1 dataset with a restrictive PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.6 0.7 0.72
All attacks lofactor 0.2 0.1 0.11
All attacks mahalanobis 0.11 0.1 0.06
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.26 0.1 0.16
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.63 0.67 0.76
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.31 0.1 0.19
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.19 0.1 0.11
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.32 0.1 0.2
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.63 0.69 0.77
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.3 0.1 0.19
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.17 0.1 0.09
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.2 0.1 0.12
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.79 0.23 0.79
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.11 0.1 0.06
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.07 0.1 0.04
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.2 0.1 0.12
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.54 0.97 0.72
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.18 0.1 0.1
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.09 0.1 0.05
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.18 0.1 0.1
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.57 0.94 0.78
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.15 0.1 0.08
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.11 0.1 0.06
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.19 0.1 0.11
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.58 0.9 0.78
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.12 0.1 0.07
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.07 0.1 0.04
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.24 0.1 0.14
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.61 0.7 0.76
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.11 0.1 0.06
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.06 0.1 0.03
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.3 0.1 0.19
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Table A.3: Comparative study results for the FV1 dataset with a permissive PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.58 0.68 0.69
All attacks lofactor 0.25 0.15 0.15
All attacks mahalanobis 0.12 0.15 0.07
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.39 0.16 0.26
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.62 0.64 0.73
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.38 0.15 0.25
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.22 0.15 0.13
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.40 0.16 0.27
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.62 0.67 0.74
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.35 0.15 0.23
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.19 0.15 0.11
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.29 0.16 0.18
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.79 0.16 0.76
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.14 0.15 0.08
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.09 0.15 0.05
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.42 0.16 0.28
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.52 0.96 0.69
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.23 0.15 0.14
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.11 0.15 0.06
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.26 0.16 0.16
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.56 0.91 0.75
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.21 0.15 0.13
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.11 0.15 0.06
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.28 0.16 0.18
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.57 0.85 0.74
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.19 0.15 0.11
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.08 0.15 0.05
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.36 0.16 0.24
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.62 0.66 0.74
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.15 0.15 0.09
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.06 0.15 0.03
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.44 0.16 0.30
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Table A.4: Comparative study results for the FV2 dataset with a very restrictive
PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.85 0.02 0.76
All attacks lofactor 0.60 0.05 0.44
All attacks mahalanobis 0.64 0.05 0.49
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.31 0.07 0.19
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.86 0.00 0.75
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.69 0.05 0.53
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.67 0.05 0.52
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.49 0.07 0.33
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.88 0.00 0.78
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.67 0.05 0.52
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.67 0.05 0.52
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.35 0.07 0.22
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.86 0.00 0.76
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.68 0.05 0.52
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.67 0.05 0.51
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.62 0.07 0.47
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.81 0.12 0.76
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.22 0.05 0.13
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.60 0.05 0.44
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.00 0.07 0.00
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.82 0.05 0.73
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.50 0.05 0.34
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.61 0.05 0.45
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.00 0.07 0.00
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.87 0.03 0.79
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.60 0.05 0.44
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.63 0.05 0.47
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.23 0.07 0.14
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.84 0.01 0.73
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.64 0.05 0.48
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.64 0.05 0.48
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.44 0.07 0.29
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Table A.5: Comparative study results for the FV2 dataset with a restrictive PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.85 0.02 0.76
All attacks lofactor 0.63 0.10 0.48
All attacks mahalanobis 0.66 0.10 0.51
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.52 0.10 0.37
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.86 0.00 0.75
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.69 0.10 0.55
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.68 0.10 0.54
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.68 0.10 0.54
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.88 0.00 0.78
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.67 0.10 0.53
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.68 0.10 0.55
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.66 0.10 0.52
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.86 0.00 0.76
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.69 0.10 0.55
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.67 0.10 0.53
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.68 0.10 0.54
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.81 0.12 0.76
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.35 0.10 0.22
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.61 0.10 0.46
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.11 0.10 0.06
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.82 0.06 0.73
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.56 0.10 0.41
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.63 0.10 0.49
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.29 0.10 0.18
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.87 0.03 0.79
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.61 0.10 0.47
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.65 0.10 0.50
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.54 0.10 0.39
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.84 0.01 0.73
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.65 0.10 0.50
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.66 0.10 0.51
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.59 0.10 0.44
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Table A.6: Comparative study results for the FV2 dataset with a permissive PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.81 0.02 0.70
All attacks lofactor 0.64 0.15 0.51
All attacks mahalanobis 0.67 0.15 0.54
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.67 0.21 0.55
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.81 0.00 0.67
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.69 0.15 0.57
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.68 0.15 0.55
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.73 0.21 0.63
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.83 0.00 0.70
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.67 0.15 0.55
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.69 0.15 0.56
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.73 0.21 0.64
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.83 0.00 0.70
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.69 0.15 0.57
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.68 0.15 0.55
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.73 0.21 0.63
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.77 0.11 0.70
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.38 0.15 0.26
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.63 0.15 0.50
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.41 0.21 0.28
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.78 0.05 0.67
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.57 0.15 0.43
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.66 0.15 0.53
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.60 0.21 0.47
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.83 0.03 0.73
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.62 0.15 0.49
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.65 0.15 0.52
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.66 0.21 0.54
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.80 0.01 0.68
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.65 0.15 0.52
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.67 0.15 0.54
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.69 0.21 0.58
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Table A.7: Comparative study results for the FV3 dataset with a very restrictive
PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.87 0.03 0.80
All attacks lofactor 0.51 0.05 0.35
All attacks mahalanobis 0.53 0.05 0.37
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.34 0.05 0.21
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.90 0.00 0.82
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.69 0.05 0.54
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.57 0.05 0.40
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.63 0.05 0.47
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.90 0.00 0.82
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.68 0.05 0.52
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.58 0.05 0.42
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.61 0.05 0.45
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.90 0.00 0.81
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.68 0.05 0.53
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.47 0.05 0.31
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.65 0.05 0.50
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.82 0.15 0.80
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.12 0.05 0.07
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.44 0.05 0.29
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.01 0.05 0.00
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.87 0.09 0.83
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.22 0.05 0.12
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.51 0.05 0.35
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.01 0.05 0.01
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.88 0.05 0.82
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.41 0.05 0.27
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.55 0.05 0.39
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.04 0.05 0.02
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.88 0.02 0.80
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.58 0.05 0.42
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.55 0.05 0.39
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.15 0.05 0.08
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Table A.8: Comparative study results for the FV3 dataset with a restrictive PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.86 0.03 0.77
All attacks lofactor 0.55 0.10 0.39
All attacks mahalanobis 0.60 0.10 0.45
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.54 0.14 0.40
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.89 0.00 0.80
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.69 0.10 0.55
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.61 0.10 0.46
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.71 0.14 0.59
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.89 0.00 0.80
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.67 0.10 0.53
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.63 0.10 0.49
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.68 0.14 0.55
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.89 0.00 0.80
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.69 0.10 0.55
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.53 0.10 0.38
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.69 0.14 0.57
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.80 0.15 0.77
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.17 0.10 0.10
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.56 0.10 0.41
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.28 0.14 0.17
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.86 0.09 0.83
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.30 0.10 0.18
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.58 0.10 0.43
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.27 0.14 0.17
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.87 0.05 0.81
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.48 0.10 0.33
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.62 0.10 0.47
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.44 0.14 0.30
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.87 0.02 0.78
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.60 0.10 0.45
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.60 0.10 0.45
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.55 0.14 0.41
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Table A.9: Comparative study results for the FV3 dataset with a permissive PFPR.
attack technique F-score FPR TPR
All attacks ocsvm 0.84 0.03 0.75
All attacks lofactor 0.57 0.15 0.43
All attacks mahalanobis 0.62 0.15 0.48
All attacks hierarchical clustering 0.62 0.22 0.49
Jamming near 4 ocsvm 0.88 0.00 0.78
Jamming near 4 lofactor 0.68 0.15 0.56
Jamming near 4 mahalanobis 0.62 0.15 0.49
Jamming near 4 hierarchical clustering 0.71 0.22 0.62
Jamming near 9 ocsvm 0.88 0.00 0.79
Jamming near 9 lofactor 0.67 0.15 0.54
Jamming near 9 mahalanobis 0.65 0.15 0.51
Jamming near 9 hierarchical clustering 0.71 0.22 0.61
Jamming near BS ocsvm 0.88 0.00 0.78
Jamming near BS lofactor 0.68 0.15 0.56
Jamming near BS mahalanobis 0.54 0.15 0.40
Jamming near BS hierarchical clustering 0.70 0.22 0.60
Selective forwarding 30% ocsvm 0.80 0.14 0.75
Selective forwarding 30% lofactor 0.23 0.15 0.14
Selective forwarding 30% mahalanobis 0.60 0.15 0.46
Selective forwarding 30% hierarchical clustering 0.37 0.22 0.25
Selective forwarding 50% ocsvm 0.85 0.08 0.81
Selective forwarding 50% lofactor 0.35 0.15 0.22
Selective forwarding 50% mahalanobis 0.60 0.15 0.46
Selective forwarding 50% hierarchical clustering 0.45 0.22 0.32
Selective forwarding 70% ocsvm 0.87 0.04 0.80
Selective forwarding 70% lofactor 0.50 0.15 0.36
Selective forwarding 70% mahalanobis 0.62 0.15 0.49
Selective forwarding 70% hierarchical clustering 0.55 0.22 0.42
Selective forwarding 90% ocsvm 0.86 0.02 0.77
Selective forwarding 90% lofactor 0.61 0.15 0.48
Selective forwarding 90% mahalanobis 0.63 0.15 0.49
Selective forwarding 90% hierarchical clustering 0.63 0.22 0.51
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